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VEILED MUSLIM WOMEN AND DRIVER’S 
LICENSE PHOTOS:                                               
A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Peninna Oren* 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 4, 2004, the Florida ACLU filed an appeal in the case 
of Freeman v. State that remains pending almost one year later.1 
The ACLU was appealing the June 6, 2003 decision of a Florida 
state intermediary level court upholding the Florida Department of 
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles’ (DHSMV) revocation of a 
Muslim woman’s driver’s license on account of the woman’s 
refusal to take a photograph for her license without her veil, or 
“niqab.”2 The Muslim woman, Sultaana Lakiana Myke Freeman, 
believes from her study of the Quran and the Sunnah that 
legislation from Allah mandates that she, as a Muslim woman, veil 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2005; B.A., Boston University, 2002. I 
would like to thank my editor Doug Brooks and the entire Journal of Law and 
Policy Executive Board, especially Skye Phillips and Cory Shindel for their 
patience and for all of the time and effort they poured into assisting me with my 
note. I would like to thank my father, Steve Oren, for teaching me not to accept 
the conclusions of others, but rather, to think for myself. I would also like to 
thank my mother, Roz Oren, for teaching me to respect those whose beliefs 
differ from my own. 
1 Telephone Interview with ACLU of Florida (April 18, 2005); Brief for 
Appellant at 44, Freeman v. State, No. 2002-CA-2828, 2003 WL 21338619 (Fla. 
Cir. Ct. June 6, 2003), available at http://www.aclufl.org/pdfs/Legal%20PDfs/ 
Freeman%20appeal%20brief.pdf. 
2 Freeman v. State, No. 2002-CA-2828, 2003 WL 21338619 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
June 6, 2003). The case was decided by the Florida Circuit Court, Ninth Judicial 
Circuit. Id. at *1. The plaintiff referred to her veil, which covers her entire face 
with the exception of her eyes, as a niqab. Id. 
OREN MACROED CORRECTED 062205.DOC 6/22/2005 3:49 PM 
856 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
her face as part of her religious obligation to dress modestly.3 
Ms. Freeman challenged the Florida statute that requires a full-
face photograph for driver’s licenses4 on the grounds that it 
violated Florida’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 19985 
(FRFRA) and Florida’s state constitution.6 The FRFRA prohibits 
the State from substantially burdening an individual’s exercise of 
religion absent a compelling state interest and proof by the State 
that the law that burdens the individual’s religious freedom is the 
least restrictive means of achieving the state’s interest.7 The free 
exercise of religion is similarly protected under Article I, Section 3 
of the Florida Constitution, which grants the right to religious 
freedom.8 
Notably, Freeman did not challenge the State’s driver’s license 
photo requirement on federal constitutional free exercise grounds 
because the Supreme Court has held that there is no federal remedy 
for individuals who claim only that their religious practices are 
interfered with by a neutral law of general applicability.9 The 
Supreme Court has left open the possibility of a “hybrid claim,” 
however, when a neutral law of general applicability interferes 
                                                          
3 See Statement by Sultaana Lakiana Myke Freeman, (May 27, 2003), 
available at http://www.aclufl.org/issues/religious_liberty/freemanpersonal_ 
statement.cfm (last visited Apr. 5, 2005). 
4 FLA. STAT. ANN § 322.142(1) (West 2004). The Florida statute describing 
the requirements for driver’s licenses uses the term “fullface photograph.” Id. § 
322.142(1). For the sake of consistency, this note will use the term “full-face 
photograph” to describe the driver’s license photographs required by the Florida 
law. In Freeman, there was an initial argument about whether a veiled Muslim 
woman fulfilled the requirement of a full-face photograph because, although 
veiled, the woman was facing the camera when her photograph was taken. 
Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *2 n.2. This note, like the Florida court, 
assumes that the full-face requirement dictates that a veiled Muslim woman 
must unveil for her driver’s license picture. 
5 FLA. STAT. ANN § 761.03 (West 2004). 
6 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *1. 
7 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03 (West 2004). 
8 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
9 Employment Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
890 (1990). A neutral law of general applicability is now subject only to rational 
basis review. Id. 
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with the free exercise of religion as well as a conjoining 
constitutional right.10 
This note examines whether laws that require veiled Muslim 
women to unveil for their driver’s license photographs violate 
these women’s Fourth Amendment right to protection against 
unreasonable searches in addition to their right to free exercise of 
religion and, therefore, give rise to a “hybrid” claim with an 
available federal remedy.11 Part I of this note summarizes the 
Freeman case. Part II describes the present status of free exercise 
jurisprudence, including hybrid claims.12 Part III.A discusses the 
components of a Fourth Amendment claim and analyzes how a 
hybrid claim might be asserted.13 Part III.B applies the hybrid 
                                                          
10 Id. at 881. “The only decisions in which we have held that the First 
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously 
motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free 
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as 
freedom of speech.” Id. 
11 Id. (noting that “hybrid” claims are the lone claims available to challenge 
a neutral law of general applicability under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment). 
12 This note does not address the question of whether driving is a privilege 
or a right because the court in Freeman treated driving as a right, despite the fact 
that the language of the driver’s license statute in question referred to driving as 
a privilege. Freeman v. State, No. 2002-CA-2828, 2003 WL 21338619, at *6 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. June 6, 2003). The Florida court stated: 
Although the Florida statutes use the term “driving privileges” this does 
not mean that driving is a “privilege” rather than a “right.” The Court 
recognizes that in Sherbert v. Verner, the U.S. Supreme Court stated 
that the distinction between privilege and right is not meaningful when 
the benefit in question, i.e., being able to drive a car and thereby 
conduct normal life activities, is the same. So even if driving is a 
“privilege,” the government may not deny Plaintiff that benefit without 
showing that there is a compelling state interest that overrides her right 
to free exercise of religion. 
Id. (citations omitted). For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s 
“unconstitutional conditions” doctrine, see Jason Mazzone, The Waiver 
Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801 (2003). 
13 Although Freeman’s claim was not successful, had Freeman’s attorneys 
attempted to make a federal hybrid claim, this claim might not have even made 
it to trial had the state made a motion under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss 
the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. If 
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claim analysis to a case such as that of Freeman by weighing a 
veiled Muslim woman’s right to Fourth Amendment protection and 
free exercise of religion against the State’s interest in the full-face 
driver’s license photo requirement. This note concludes that a 
Muslim woman who wishes to be photographed for her driver’s 
license may assert a hybrid claim, however, given the fact that 
there has yet to be a successful hybrid claim, it is doubtful that her 
claim would be successful. 
I. FREEMAN V. STATE 
In Freeman v. State, the Florida Circuit Court of the Ninth 
Judicial District decided the case of Ms. Freeman, whose 
previously-issued driver’s license was revoked after she refused to 
take a new picture for her driver’s license without her full-face 
veil.14 The Florida court evaluated the Freeman case under both 
the Florida Constitution,15 which grants the right to religious 
freedom, and the FRFRA,16 which prohibits the State from 
                                                          
the court had decided in a pre-trial motion that Freeman did not have a valid 
hybrid claim, her case would not have been heard. Therefore, Freeman’s lawyers 
were better off challenging the law under Florida’s RFRA, which provides an 
available remedy. Indeed, only twelve states have legislation that protects the 
free exercise of religion. See infra note 98. In states without free exercise 
legislation, a plaintiff would have little to lose by asserting a hybrid claim 
(except of course the money spent on attorney’s fees). 
14 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619. 
15 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (West 2004). “There shall be no law respecting 
the establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise 
thereof . . . .” Id. 
16 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03 (West 2004). In relevant part, the statute 
reads: 
(1) The government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise 
of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability, except that government may substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of 
the burden to the person: 
(a) Is in furtherance of compelling governmental interest; and 
(b) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest. 
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substantially burdening the free exercise of religion unless the 
State can prove both a compelling state interest and that the law is 
the least restrictive means of achieving the State’s goal.17 The 
Freeman court held that Freeman’s right to free exercise of 
religion was not substantially burdened, but nevertheless analyzed 
the State’s compelling interest in the driver’s license statute, 
holding that strict scrutiny review was required because Freeman 
alleged an infringement upon her fundamental constitutional right 
to free exercise of religion.18 
A. Freeman’s Case 
On February 21, 2001, the State of Florida issued Sultaana 
Lakiana Myke Freeman a driver’s license that contained a picture 
of her wearing a full-face veil, or niqab, so that only her eyes were 
visible.19 Freeman’s face was similarly covered in the photograph 
on her driver’s license from Illinois, where she lived prior to her 
move to Florida.20 On November 28, 2001 and December 18, 
2001, Freeman received letters from the State of Florida informing 
her that her license would be revoked if she did not report to the 
DHSMV to be photographed without her veil for her driver’s 
license.21 For religious reasons, Freeman refused to comply, and 
her license was revoked.22 Freeman then brought an action 
challenging Florida’s revocation of her driver’s license under the 
FRFRA and the Florida Constitution.23 
The court found that the driver’s license requirement did not 
substantially burden Freeman because the DHSMV had a practice 
                                                          
(2) A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of 
this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial 
proceeding and obtain appropriate relief. 
Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619 at *1. 
19 Id. at *4. 
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of accommodating women who veil by having a female employee 
photograph them in a private room so that the women’s face and 
hair would only be exposed to a female employee and, in certain 
situations (for example, when women were pulled over) to law 
enforcement officers.24 Because the court found no substantial 
burden, it held that the statute did not violate the FRFRA, given 
that the Act only precludes the State from substantially burdening 
an individual’s free exercise of religion and does not prohibit the 
State from enacting a statute that places a lesser burden on an 
individual’s free exercise of religion.25 
The court also addressed Freeman’s constitutional claim.26 
Article I, Section 3 of Florida’s constitution provides: “There shall 
be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or 
penalizing the free exercise thereof. Religious freedom shall not 
justify practices inconsistent with public morals, peace, or 
safety . . . .”27 
The Florida court held that it was required to apply the strict 
scrutiny standard of review to Freeman’s constitutional claim to 
determine whether the State had a compelling interest to justify its 
restriction of a religious practice.28 The court thus analyzed 
whether the State had a compelling interest in the statute requiring 
full-face driver’s license photographs.29 
B. The Freeman Court’s Compelling Interest Analysis 
Freeman argued that the State did not have a compelling 
interest in restricting her right to have a driver’s license without a 
full-face photograph because a driver’s license is not a state 
identification card, but rather, is “merely certification of 
competence to drive.”30 Freeman relied on three cases upholding 
the right of religious Christians to receive driver’s licenses without 
                                                          
24 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *3. 
25 Id. at *4. 
26 Id. at *1. 
27 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
28 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *1. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at *5. 
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photographs because of their religious beliefs that photographs 
constitute graven images.31 Specifically, Freeman cited Quaring v. 
Peterson, in which the Eighth Circuit held that there was no 
compelling state interest in the photograph requirement because 
individuals who possessed out-of-state licenses that did not contain 
photographs were permitted to drive in the state.32 Further, 
Freeman cited Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of 
Prayer33 and Dennis v. Charnes, which held that allowing an 
exception for individuals whose religions proscribe the taking of 
photographs would not lead to widespread abuse.34 
In addition to arguing that her claims should be considered 
under the same reasoning as the graven images cases, Freeman 
also challenged the utility and accuracy of driver’s license 
photographs.35 Specifically, Freeman contended that photographs 
are “largely flawed” and can be “easily thwarted” by those who 
“change their hair, cover their foreheads and ears, wear large 
glasses, shave their heads, grow their beards, or alter their 
appearance by other means, including contact lenses and plastic 
surgery.”36 
Freeman further argued that there are more than 4,000 people 
to whom the State of Florida issued photo-less driver’s licenses 
and tens of thousands of people from other states with photo-less 
driver’s licenses driving in the State of Florida.37 Thus, she argued, 
Florida lacked a compelling interest in refusing to grant religious 
exceptions to its driver’s license photograph requirement.38 
In holding for the State, the Florida court adopted the State’s 
arguments as its own analysis.39 The State argued that it had a 
                                                          
31 Id. 
32 Id. (citing Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984)). 
33 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *5 (citing Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. 
Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. 1978)). 
34 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *5 (citing Dennis v. Charnes, 805 F.2d 
339 (10th Cir. 1984)). 
35 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *5. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at *6. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at *3-7. 
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compelling interest in the full-face photograph requirement 
because the requirement promotes safety and security, combats 
crime, and protects interstate commerce.40 In response to 
Freeman’s argument that photographs are not effective, the State 
presented a witness who testified that photographs of faces that 
have changed are still more effective than veiled photographs 
because some facial features do not change.41 Furthermore, the 
State contended that, without a full-face photograph, law 
enforcement officers would be at a greater risk when they stopped 
individuals, given the extra time necessary to verify the driver’s 
identity.42 The State also asserted that, despite the fact that such 
intent does not appear in the driver’s license statute, driver’s 
licenses are intended for use as identity documents by people in 
“society at large to cash checks, rent cars and clear airport 
security.”43 Moreover, the State distinguished Freeman’s case from 
earlier cases permitting exceptions to the driver’s license 
photograph requirements.44 In adopting the State’s analysis, the 
court noted that the world is different than it was twenty to twenty-
five years ago and that since 1978, when the first of the three cases 
cited by Freeman was decided, the increased degree of domestic 
terror has amplified the potential for widespread abuse.45 
Next, the court rejected the argument that Freeman should be 
granted an exception based on the fact that others, including out-
of-state drivers and those with temporary licenses, are legally 
allowed to drive in Florida without a full-face photograph on their 
                                                          
40 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *4. 
41 Id. at *5. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at *7. 
45 Id. According to the U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission, the U.S. 
Department of Transportation reported that there were 364 hijackings worldwide 
from 1968 until 1972. There were no hijackings from February 1991 until 
September 11, 2001. Judy Rumerman, U.S. Centennial Flight Commission; 
Aviation Security, available at http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/ 
Government_Role/security/POL18.htm (last visited May 18, 2005). There have 
been no hijackings since September 11, 2001. Eli Lehrer, The Homeland 
Security Bureaucracy, PUBLIC INTEREST, June 22, 2004, at 71. 
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licenses.46 The court explained that individuals with temporary 
licenses that did not contain photographs had already received a 
permanent license, and therefore, the State possessed a full-face 
photograph of those individuals.47 The court held that the State of 
Florida cannot control the laws of other states and must accept 
their citizens’ driver’s licenses because full faith and credit is given 
to the laws of other states.48 The court held that Florida can, 
however, exert control over its own residents and impose 
regulations regarding the requirements for obtaining driver’s 
licenses within the state.49 
Based on its analysis of both parties’ arguments, the court 
found that the driver’s license statute promoted public safety and 
protected against fraud, and thus, the State had a compelling 
interest in the statute that outweighed the seemingly insubstantial 
burden the law posed to the free exercise of religion.50 The court 
also explained that, given the accommodations put in place by the 
DHSMV, the statute was the least restrictive means of furthering 
the State’s interest.51 Thus, the court held that the driver’s license 
statute did not violate Article I, Section 3 of the Florida 
Constitution.52 
II. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CLAIMS 
Freeman challenged the revocation of her driver’s license due 
to her refusal to unveil under the FRFRA and Florida’s state 
                                                          
46 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *6. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (West 2005) provides: 
[a]cts of the legislature of any state, territory or possession of the 
United States . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court 
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they 
have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or 
Possession from which they are taken. 
Id. 
49 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *6. 
50 Id. at *7-8. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
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constitution.53 Freeman notably pursued these avenues of relief 
based on the lack of a federal remedy. A federal claim under the 
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause would have been 
unsuccessful54 because such a claim, which alleges only a violation 
of a person’s freedom of religion, no longer applies to neutral laws 
of general applicability.55 This section discusses Supreme Court 
case law regarding federal free exercise review and analyzes the 
remedies that remain available to individuals whose free exercise 
of religion is substantially burdened by neutral laws of general 
applicability. 
A. Federal Free Exercise Clause Review 
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides 
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .”56 In Sherbert 
v. Verner, the Supreme Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause 
to mean that “if the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the 
observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously 
between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though 
the burdens may be characterized as only indirect.”57 Under this 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court 
                                                          
53 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *1. 
54 See The Case of Mrs. Sultaana Freeman, at http://www.aclufl.org/ 
news_events/archive/2003/freemanrelease052703.cfm. The Florida ACLU 
represented Freeman and discusses her case on the organization’s website. 
55 Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age 
in the State Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235, 238 (1998) (“As a result [of 
Flores], the states are no longer bound by any federal standard, whether 
statutory or constitutional, to exempt the religiously devout from neutral laws of 
general applicability.”). Driver’s license requirements are neutral laws of 
general applicability because they were written with the neutral intention of 
regulating drivers and not to regulate religious activity, and they are generally 
applicable in that they apply to the entire public equally and are not applied 
exclusively to religious individuals. Employment Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of 
Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
56 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
57 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 
366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)) (emphasis added). 
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invalidated a number of neutral, generally applicable laws as they 
applied to the religiously observant.58 
In Sherbert, the petitioner, a Seventh Day Adventist, was fired 
from her job because, for religious reasons, she would not work on 
Saturdays.59 While the petitioner sought other employment 
following her dismissal, she refused to accept positions that 
required her to work on Saturdays and could not find a job that did 
not require her to do so.60 The petitioner was subsequently denied 
unemployment benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment 
Compensation Act, which provided that a person is not eligible for 
benefits if “he has failed without good cause . . . to accept available 
suitable work when offered to him by the employment office or the 
employer.”61 In reviewing the petitioner’s claim, the Sherbert 
Court applied a balancing test, equivalent to strict scrutiny review, 
in which it balanced the state’s compelling interest in the law 
against the substantial burden the law imposed on the plaintiff’s 
religious practices.62 The Court found that the substantial burden of 
the petitioner’s being required to work on her Sabbath or forgo 
state benefits outweighed the state’s interest in preventing 
fraudulent claims that would dilute unemployment funds and 
disrupt work schedules.63 
                                                          
58 See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 
146 (1987) (holding that Florida’s refusal to award unemployment 
compensation benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who quit her job because she 
would not work on her Sabbath was unconstitutional under the Free Exercise 
Clause); Thompson v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 
720 (1981) (holding that the state’s termination of petitioner’s unemployment on 
the grounds that the petitioner quit his job violated the Free Exercise Clause 
because his religion prohibited making armaments); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205 (1972) (excepting the Amish from a general state law requiring that 
children remain in school until they are sixteen years of age). 
59 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399. This balancing test is also called “strict 
scrutiny.” See id. at 908-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referring to the Sherbert 
test as strict scrutiny review). 
60 Id. at 402 n.3. 
61 Id. at 400-01 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 68-1-404 (Law Co-op. 1962)). 
62 Employment Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
875 (1990) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). 
63 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407. 
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In 1990, however, the Court narrowed its definition of free 
exercise. In Employment Division v. Smith,64 the Supreme Court 
rejected the application of strict scrutiny review to free exercise 
claims.65 In Smith, the Court considered the case of two Native 
Americans who were dismissed from their jobs for ingesting 
peyote during a religious service and who were subsequently 
denied unemployment benefits by the State of Oregon because 
ingesting peyote was a criminal offense under Oregon state law.66 
The Supreme Court of Oregon applied strict scrutiny and held that, 
although the respondents had committed a crime by using peyote, 
the purpose of the unemployment law, which precluded the receipt 
of benefits by individuals who were dismissed from their jobs for 
misconduct, was not to punish individuals for crimes, but rather, to 
preserve the fund’s integrity.67 The court held that the burden on 
the respondent’s religious practice outweighed the purpose of the 
law; therefore, the law was unconstitutional.68 
The U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Oregon Supreme 
Court’s decision, rejecting the application of strict scrutiny to a 
free exercise claim that challenged a neutral law of general 
applicability.69 The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause would 
be violated were a law to specifically target a religious group or 
religious observance, for example, if a statute were to specifically 
prohibit “bowing down before a golden calf.”70 The Court noted, 
however, that the right to free exercise of religion under the First 
Amendment is not unlimited.71 The Court explained that to allow 
individuals in all circumstances to practice their religions, even 
when their doing so would conflict with existing, generally 
applicable law, would “contradict[ ] both constitutional tradition 
and common sense” because individuals would be excused from 
following the law whenever their religions conflicted with the 
                                                          
64 Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. 
65 Id. at 884. 
66 Id. at 872. 
67 Id. at 875. 
68 Smith, 494 U.S. at 875. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 878. 
71 Id. at 886. 
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laws.72 The Court cited a sampling of cases in which it had rejected 
the extension of free exercise protection to individuals when state 
laws interfered with the practice of religion.73 The Court’s 
examples included laws prohibiting polygamy and child labor, and 
those requiring the payment of Social Security taxes.74 The Court 
noted that it had never invalidated a neutral law of general 
applicability when the law interfered only with a person’s right to 
free exercise of religion.75 
Rather than applying strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court in 
Smith76 held that it is up to the “political process” and not the 
courts to protect the interests of individuals whose religious 
practices are interfered with by a neutral, generally applied state 
law.77 Although it rejected the use of the strict scrutiny as the 
standard of review for free exercise claims, the Smith Court did not 
overrule Sherbert.78 Instead, the Court distinguished the case 
before it from Sherbert, stating that strict scrutiny applied only to 
“employment compensation” cases, not criminal matters, as 
examined in Smith.79 The Supreme Court explained that the issue 
                                                          
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 879-80 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) 
(holding that a person who believed, based on his religion, that a law prohibiting 
bigamy should not have been enacted is not immune from prosecution for 
violating that law); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that a 
woman who used her child to distribute literature on the street could be 
prosecuted for violation of child labor laws, despite the fact that the literature 
being distributed was religious); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1985) 
(holding that an Amish person was not exempt from paying Social Security 
taxes, even though his religion prohibited taking part in governmental support 
programs)). 
74 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886. 
75 Id. at 878-79. “We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs 
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct 
that the State is free to regulate.” Id. 
76 Id. at 872. 
77 Id. at 872, 890. The phrase “political process” describes the legislature. 
Id. 
78 Id. at 884 (holding that “[e]ven if we were inclined to breathe into 
Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment compensation field, we would not 
apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law”). 
79 Id. 
OREN MACROED CORRECTED 062205.DOC 6/22/2005 3:49 PM 
868 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
in Smith was not whether Oregon could deny the respondents 
benefits, but rather, whether the Oregon criminal statute, which 
generally prohibits the use of peyote, could be applied to 
individuals whose religion required its use.80 The Court held that 
unemployment compensation cases belong to a separate class of 
cases in which exceptions for free exercise of religion are 
permitted because “a distinctive feature of unemployment 
compensation programs is that their eligibility criteria invite 
consideration of the particular circumstances behind an applicant’s 
unemployment.”81 The Court further held “that where the state has 
in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to 
extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without 
compelling reason.”82 
The Court also distinguished Smith from prior Supreme Court 
cases in which it had invalidated statutes as applied to the 
religiously observant, holding that the burden on the religious 
individuals in those cases outweighed the states’ compelling 
interests in the challenged statutes.83 The Court held that the cases 
in which it had invalidated laws on free exercise grounds involved 
both a right to free exercise and a conjoining additional 
constitutional claim, and that strict scrutiny is only available in 
such “hybrid” cases.84 As a result of Smith, under existing federal 
law, a court may still apply strict scrutiny in free exercise cases 
involving 1) laws that are not neutral and generally applicable 2) 
unemployment compensation, or 3) a free exercise claim that is 
                                                          
80 Id. at 876. 
81 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
82 Id. (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)). 
83 Id. at 881-82. 
84 Id. (citing Catwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)) (containing 
conjoining free speech and free press claims); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 
U.S. 105 (1943) (containing a conjoining free speech claim); Follet v. 
McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (same); Pierce v. Society Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925) (containing conjoining claim of parents’ right to direct the education 
of their children); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (same); Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (decided on free speech grounds, but containing 
a conjoining free exercise claim); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624 (1943) (same). 
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conjoined with another constitutional claim.85 However, when a 
neutral law of general applicability violates only the right to free 
exercise of religion, the state must survive only rational basis 
review, the lowest form of scrutiny. To prevail under rational basis 
review, the state need only prove that its law is rationally related to 
a legitimate state interest.86 
B. The Federal and State Legislative Response to the Smith 
Decision 
In response to Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).87 The Senate Report that 
accompanied the Act criticized the Smith decision and explained 
that “the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of 
religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First 
Amendment to the Constitution.”88 The report also stated that 
“laws ‘neutral’ towards religion may burden religious exercise as 
surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.”89 The 
                                                          
85 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85 (holding the Sherbert test inapplicable to 
challenges against generally applicable laws on free exercise grounds, but 
excepting employment cases from those to which the Sherbert test applies). See 
also Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School District, 135 F.3d 694, 700 n.5 
(10th Cir. 1998) (“The Smith opinion does not make it clear whether it is 
constitutionally sufficient for a law or policy to be neutral and of general 
applicability, or whether the policy or law will still have to satisfy some lesser 
standard than the compelling interest test.”). 
86 S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 7-8 (1993) (stating that the review remaining 
after Smith when a neutral law of general applicability interferes with a person’s 
religious observance is rational basis review). 
87 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb (1993). The statute lists as its purpose: 
(1) to restore the compelling state interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. 
Verner, 373 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise 
of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or 
defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened 
by the government. 
Id. § 2000bb(b) (1993). 
88 S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 2-3 (1993). 
89 Id. 
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report further criticized the Smith decision, stating that “[b]y 
lowering the level of constitutional protection for religious 
practices, the decision has created a climate in which the free 
exercise of religion is jeopardized.”90 
In recognition of these concerns, the RFRA reinstated strict 
scrutiny as the test for determining whether a federal or state law 
violates the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution.91 In 
relevant part, the RFRA provided that the “[g]overnment shall not 
substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion . . . 
[unless] it is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
interest.”92 
In 1997, the Supreme Court, in City of Boerne v. Flores, struck 
down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 as it applied 
to the states, holding that Congress had exceeded its power under 
the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.93 City of 
Boerne involved an RFRA challenge to city zoning ordinances by 
a Catholic archbishop who was denied a permit to enlarge his 
church.94 The Court held that, under the Enforcement Clause, 
Congress has the power to make laws that protect people from 
state infringement upon their constitutional rights.95 However, 
                                                          
90 Id. 
91 Id. See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516-17 (1997). 
92 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 (West Supp. 2004). The RFRA defined 
“government” as “a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or 
other person acting under color of law) of the United States or a covered entity.” 
The RFRA defined “covered entity” as “the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and each territory and possession of the United 
States.” Id. 
93 Flores, 521 U.S. at 536. The Court held: 
When the political branches of the Government act against the 
background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already 
issued . . . in later cases the Court will treat its precedent with the 
respect due them under settled principals . . . as the provisions of the 
federal statute here invoked are beyond congressional authority, it is the 
Court’s precedent, not the RFRA, which must control. 
Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 517. 
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because the Supreme Court held in Smith that strict scrutiny is not 
available when a general law of neutral applicability interferes 
with one’s exercise of religion, Congress cannot be said to be 
enforcing the constitutional right of free exercise of religion 
through the RFRA because the rights that the RFRA grants are not 
provided for by the Free Exercise Clause.96 In other words, the 
Court determined that the RFRA was unconstitutional because the 
Act provided for rights not granted in the Constitution.97 
                                                          
96 Id. In response to the Supreme Court’s striking down the RFRA, 
Congress has passed the Protection of Religious Exercise in Land Use and by 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RRLUIPA) which reinstated strict scrutiny as the 
test for more narrow instances of government interference with individuals’ free 
exercise of religion including land use and zoning regulations and over people 
residing in or confined to government institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (West 
2005). In Elsinore Christian Center v. City Lake of Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 
1083 (C.D. Cal. 2003), the district court for the central district of California 
found RLUIPA unconstitutional, holding it exceeds Congress’s enforcement 
power. But see U.S. v. Maui County, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (D. Haw. 2003) 
(rejecting challenge to RLUIPA on the grounds that RLUIPA violates the 
Establishment Clause). See also Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of West Linn, 86 P.3d 1140 
(Or. Ct. App. 2004) (finding no substantial burden to Plaintiffs under RLUIPA). 
For a discussion of the constitutionality of RLUIPA in comparison to the RFRA, 
see Michael Paisner, Boerne Supremacy: Congressional Responses to City of 
Boerne v. Flores and the Scope of Congress’s Article I Power, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 537 (2005). 
97 Id. Congress’s enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment 
extends only to enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this 
case, the petitioner asserted that Congress was enforcing the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which, in pertinent part, 
reads: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process under the law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. However, the Supreme Court held in Smith that 
the right to free exercise of religion does not require strict scrutiny when neutral 
laws of general applicability interfere only with an individual’s practice of 
religion. Therefore, strict scrutiny is not one of the privileges of citizens of the 
United States and Congress has no right to direct the state legislation in this 
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In response to the Supreme Court’s rejection of both the 
Sherbert test and the RFRA, a number of states enacted legislation 
requiring a balancing test similar to Sherbert for neutral, generally 
applicable laws that impede freedom of religion.98 Florida is 
among the states that have enacted Religious Freedom Restoration 
Acts in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Smith and 
City of Boerne.99 Florida’s RFRA provides for strict scrutiny 
review like Sherbert and the federal RFRA.100 
                                                          
manner. Flores, 521 U.S. at 536 (“RFRA was designed to control cases and 
controversies, such as the one before us; but as the provisions of the federal 
statute here invoked are beyond congressional authority, it is this Court’s 
precedent, not RFRA, which must control.”). Although the Supreme Court has 
not ruled on whether the RFRA is constitutional as applied to the federal 
government, many circuit courts have held that this is so. See Anne Y. Chiu, 
When Prisoners Are Weary and Their Religious Exercise Burdened, RLUIPA 
Provides Some Rest for Their Souls, 79 WASH. L. REV. 999, 1004 n. 49 (stating 
that the RFRA seems to remain valid as applied to the federal government) 
(citing O’Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 400-01 (7th Cir. 2003)); 
Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2002); Henderson v. Kennedy, 
265 F.3d 1072, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958 
(10th Cir. 2001); Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 
141 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 1998)). 
98 According to RJ&L Religious Liberty Archive, a religious liberty 
watchdog organization, twelve states have enacted their own statutes protecting 
the free exercise of religion. See http://www.churchstatelaw.com/ 
statestatutes/index.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2005). These states include 
Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico, 
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Texas. See ALA. CONST. amend. NO. 
622 (1999); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1493(1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b 
(1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01-761.05 (1998); IDAHO CODE § 73-401-404 
(2000); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15 (West 2004); MO. REV. STAT. §1.302 
(2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-1(1978); OKLA. STAT. 51 §§ 251-58 (2000); 
R.I. GEN. LAW § 42-80-1 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-10-60 (1999); TEX. 
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 110 (1999). 
99 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01-761.05 (1998). 
100 Florida’s RFRA provides: 
The government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, 
except that government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the 
person: (b) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest. 
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C. Hybrid Claims 
Although no federal legal remedy lies when a neutral law of 
general applicability interferes with the right to free exercise of 
religion standing alone, the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that a petitioner may challenge a law on Free Exercise Clause 
grounds if the petitioner’s free exercise claim is joined with a 
claim based on the violation of another constitutional freedom, 
such as freedom of speech.101 In such “hybrid” cases, in which a 
generally applicable law is challenged on the basis of the Free 
Exercise Clause and another constitutional freedom, strict scrutiny 
appears to remain available.102 
To date, no circuit court has actually applied strict scrutiny to a 
hybrid claim.103 However, of the circuits that have decided cases in 
which hybrid claims were asserted,104 with the exception of the 
Second and Sixth Circuits, all have recognized the existence of 
                                                          
Id. § 761.03(1)(b). 
101 Employment Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
881 (1990). 
102 See Crane, supra note 55, at 236 (“The strict scrutiny test of earlier 
cases would now be reserved for “hybrid” cases—those involving a combination 
of free exercise rights and constitutional rights.”). 
103 Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2003). Hybrid claims 
were basically irrelevant from 1993 to 1997 because, during that time, plaintiffs 
asserting free exercise claims could do so under the federal RFRA. See infra 
Part I.A. 
104 The First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. 
Circuits have decided cases in which hybrid claims were asserted. See Leebaert 
v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2003); Civil Liberties for Urban 
Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003); Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, 
Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002); Prater v. City of 
Burnside, Kentucky 289 F.3d 417, 430 (6th Cir. 2002); American Family 
Assoc., Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School District, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 
1998); EEOC v. Catholic Charities of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 
Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995). For 
further discussion of the split within in the Circuits regarding the status of 
hybrid claims, see Ryan M. Akers, Begging the High Court for Clarification; 
Hybrid Rights Under Employment Division v. Smith, 17 REGENT. U. L. REV. 77 
(2004-2005). 
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such a claim.105 The Second and Sixth Circuits have held that the 
Court’s discussion of hybrid claims in Smith is not part of the 
Court’s holding, but rather, is merely dicta; the circuits thus 
maintain that Smith overruled the Sherbert test for all neutral laws 
of general applicability, including those brought as hybrid 
claims.106 The circuits that recognize hybrid claims differ in 
opinion with regard to whether the claim conjoined with the free 
exercise claim must be successful on its own or whether the claim 
must simply be one with “a ‘fair probability’ or ‘likelihood’ but 
not a certitude of success on the merits.”107 
In Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School District, for 
                                                          
105 See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752 
(7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing a hybrid claim, but holding that a plaintiff fails to 
assert a valid hybrid claim by conjoining a free exercise claim with a meritless 
claim). See also Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 
165 n.26 (3d Cir. 2002) (recognizing hybrid claims, but noting that the plaintiffs 
did not assert such a hybrid rights claim); American Family Assoc., Inc. v. City 
& County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing hybrid 
claims, but holding that the conjoined claim must be colorable, which the 
plaintiff’s free speech claim was not); Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School 
District, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing hybrid claims, but 
holding that in order to succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must be able to 
succeed independently on the claim conjoined with the free exercise claim); 
EEOC v. Catholic Charities of America, 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(recognizing the possibility that the respondents had a valid hybrid claim, but 
denying petitioner’s claim on other grounds); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer 
Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995) (recognizing the existence of 
hybrid claims, but denying petitioner’s claim because there was no violation of a 
privacy right). 
106 Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2003); Prater v. City 
of Burnside, Kentucky 289 F.3d 417, 430 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that Smith 
overruled the compelling state interest/least restrictive means test for a neutral 
law of general applicability, including those cases in which hybrid claims were 
asserted). 
107 Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School District, 135 F.3d 694, 700 
(10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing the availability of a hybrid claim, but holding that 
in order to succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must be able to succeed 
independently on the conjoined constitutional claim). See also Miller v. Reed, 
176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Thompson v. Anchorage Equal 
Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 703, 707 (9th Cir. 1999)) (holding that a 
conjoined claim does not require a certitude of success). 
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example, the Tenth Circuit rejected a hybrid claim brought by 
Christian parents who desired that their home-schooled daughter 
take classes at a local public school.108 The parents challenged the 
local school board’s decision requiring that students be enrolled 
either full-time or not at all, and alleged a violation of the Free 
Exercise Clause as well as the constitutional right of parents to 
direct their children’s education.109 The Tenth Circuit held that, 
although “parents have a constitutional right to direct [their 
child’s] education, up to a point . . . parents simply do not have a 
constitutional right to control each and every aspect of their 
children’s education and oust the state’s authority over that 
subject.”110 Based on this rationale, the Swanson court found that 
the petitioners did not have a valid claim based on their 
constitutional right to direct their child’s education.111 The court 
held that “it is not sufficient simply to invoke the Free Exercise 
Clause as well as another general constitutional claim to trigger the 
compelling-interest/narrowly-tailored-rule analysis,” but rather, 
there must be a “colorable showing of infringement of recognized 
and specific constitutional rights.”112 The Tenth Circuit, in essence, 
required that the claim conjoined with the free exercise claim be 
one that would succeed independently.113 
Conversely, in Miller v. Reed, the Ninth Circuit specifically 
held that its test was less stringent than that of other circuits, given 
that it did not require a “certitude” that the conjoined claim would 
succeed on the merits, but only a “fair probability” or “likelihood” 
that such a claim would succeed.114 In Miller, a religious individual 
                                                          
108 Swanson, 135 F.3d at 696-97. 
109 Id. at 697, 699. 
110 Id. at 699. 
111 Id. at 700 (citing a host of cases in which courts rejected the claims of 
parents asserting a constitutional right to direct their child’s education). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We recently held, 
to assert a hybrid-rights claim, ‘a free exercise plaintiff must make out a 
‘colorable claim’ that a companion right has been violated-that is, a ‘fair 
probability’ or a ‘likelihood,’ but not a certitude, of success on the merits.”) 
(quoting Thompson v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 703, 
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who was not a member of an organized religion challenged the 
state’s requirement that he submit his social security number in 
order to renew his driver’s license.115 The plaintiff claimed that 
this requirement interfered with his religious belief because being 
identified by a number diminished his identity as an individual and 
also that the restriction violated his fundamental right to interstate 
travel.116 The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff did not articulate 
a valid hybrid claim because the conjoining constitutional claim 
was “utterly meritless,” given that denying the plaintiff a driver’s 
license would not prevent his interstate travel in the same way that 
gasoline taxes and toll roads do not violate the right to interstate 
travel.117 Although the Miller court distinguished its analysis from 
that of more stringent circuits, the court utilized virtually the same 
analysis as the Swanson court; it evaluated the conjoining claim 
independently and then specifically denied the hybrid claim based 
on the weakness of the conjoining claim.118 
Both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ holdings indicate that, 
regardless of whether a probability or a certainty of success is 
required, the analysis of a hybrid claim centers on whether the 
conjoining claim can survive on its own.119 Requiring a strong or 
“colorable” conjoining claim, however, diminishes the utility of a 
hybrid claim, as plaintiffs may sue on the conjoining claim 
alone.120 As Justice Souter noted in his concurring opinion in 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, “if a 
hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an 
exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable law under 
                                                          
707 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds by 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
115 Miller, 176 F.3d at 1204. 
116 Id. at 1204-05 (holding that because the petitioner could still travel 
interstate as a passenger that the examined law did not affect the petitioner’s 
right to travel, but rather, his operation of a motor vehicle). 
117 Id. at 1205-06. The court noted, “Other circuits have adopted similar or 
more stringent predicates for a hybrid rights claim.” Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Swanson, 135 F.3d at 699. 
120 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hileah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 
(1993) (Souter J., concurring) (noting that requiring the conjoining claim of a 
hybrid claim to be strong on its own alleviates the need for a hybrid claim). 
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another constitutional provision, then there would have been no 
reason in what Smith calls the hybrid cases to have mentioned the 
Free Exercise Clause at all.”121 
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to decide a hybrid claim. The 
Court referenced hybrid claims most recently in 2002, in 
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of 
Stratton.122 In Watchtower, a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses 
challenged on both free exercise and free speech grounds a village 
ordinance requiring that door-to-door canvassers or solicitors 
obtain a permit.123 The Court held that it was “unnecessary to 
[determine the standard of review] because the breadth of speech 
affected by the ordinance and the nature of the regulation make it 
clear that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding it.”124 The 
question of how strong a conjoining claim must be to support a 
valid hybrid claim and obtain strict scrutiny review thus remains 
unanswered. 
III. SEARCH CLAIMS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
In addition to a free exercise claim, a veiled Muslim woman 
may assert that requiring her to unveil constitutes an unreasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment. This section analyzes the 
components of a Fourth Amendment claim. 
The Fourth Amendment protects people “against unreasonable 
                                                          
121 Id. Hileah was not a hybrid case. The petitioners challenged city 
ordinances banning ritual sacrifice. Id. The Court invalidated the ordinances, 
finding that Smith was inapplicable because the ordinances were not neutral. Id. 
122 Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of 
Straton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 164. The Court held: 
The mere fact that the ordinance covers so much speech raises 
constitutional concern. It is offensive not only to the values protected 
by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society—that 
in the context of every day public discourse a citizen must first inform 
the government of her desire to speak with her neighbors and then 
obtain a permit to do so. 
Id. at 165-66. 
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searches and seizures.”125 In his concurring opinion in United 
States v. Katz, Justice Harlan set forth a two-prong test for 
determining whether an action constitutes a search.126 The test 
requires both that the person allegedly searched have a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the subject of the claimed search and that 
society recognize the person’s expectation as a reasonable one.127 
Because the Constitution protects only against unreasonable 
searches, once an action is determined to be a search, the Supreme 
Court must then determine whether that search was reasonable.128 
The Court has determined that individualized suspicion is required 
for a search to be deemed reasonable, unless authorities can 
establish the existence of “special needs beyond the normal need 
for law enforcement.”129 
A. Unveiling as a Search 
The Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States,130 held that what 
a person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to 
the public, may be constitutionally protected.”131 However, “[w]hat 
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection.”132 The 
Katz Court held that the police’s taping of the petitioner’s phone 
calls, made within a public phone booth and taped using a device 
attached to the outside of the phone booth, constituted a search.133 
                                                          
125 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
126 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan J., concurring) 
(“My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that 
there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). 
127 Id. 
128 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
129 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37 (citing Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646 (1995)). 
130 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
131 Id. at 351. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 356-57. 
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Because the petitioner in Katz had a reasonable expectation that his 
conversations were private, the Court reasoned, he “may rely on 
the Fourth Amendment.”134 
In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan articulated a 
two-prong test that “emerged from prior decisions” and was to be 
applied in cases in which a right to privacy was asserted to 
determine whether a search had taken place.135 Justice Harlan’s test 
examines 1) whether “a person exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy,” and 2) whether “the expectation . . . [is] 
one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”136 This 
two-prong test was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court as 
the test for determining whether an individual enjoys a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a given case, and therefore, receives 
Fourth Amendment protection.137 Thus, under present law, in order 
for a veiled Muslim woman to successfully assert a right to privacy 
in her face, she must demonstrate not only that she has a subjective 
expectation of privacy in her face, but also that society is prepared 
to recognize that expectation as reasonable.138 
1. The Katz Test: Subjective Expectation of Privacy 
In explaining what is meant by something a person “seeks to 
preserve as private” the Katz Court cited with approval its earlier 
decision in Rios v. United States,139 in which it held that the 
                                                          
134 Id. at 352 (holding that “[o]ne who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the 
door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely 
entitled to assume the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast 
to the world”). 
135 Id. at 361 (Harlan J., concurring). 
136 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
137 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984) (holding that the 
petitioner failed to satisfy the two-prong test because, although he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his jail cell, it was not one society was 
prepared to accept as reasonable); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
740 (1979) (holding that the petitioner did not establish either a subjective or an 
objective expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed from his 
telephone). 
138 See also Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (Harlan J., concurring). 
139 Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960). 
OREN MACROED CORRECTED 062205.DOC 6/22/2005 3:49 PM 
880 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
admissibility as evidence of a package of heroin that was dropped 
on the floor of a taxi cab turned on whether the petitioner dropped 
the package before or after the police arrested him.140 If the police 
arrested the petitioner without probable cause and thereafter saw 
the package of heroin, the search and arrest would be unlawful, 
and the package of heroin would be inadmissible.141 However, if 
the petitioner held the package in the officers’ view and the 
officers then arrested him based upon probable cause, that is, upon 
seeing the package of heroin, then evidence of the package would 
be admissible.142 The Katz Court cited Rios to emphasize that 
when a person makes an effort to preserve something as private, as 
the petitioner may have done in the Rios case by hiding the 
package of heroin on the floor of the cab, that this “something” 
merits constitutional protection.143 
Courts have reviewed several cases involving an individual’s 
right to privacy in certain physical attributes.144 Because those 
courts did not find a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
examined physical characteristics, such as one’s voice, 
handwriting, hands, and eyes, they did not reach the question of 
whether society was prepared to recognize the individuals’ 
expectations of privacy as reasonable.145 
For example, the Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Richardson, 
analyzed the right to privacy in one’s hands.146 The Richardson 
court held that examining the petitioner’s hands under an 
ultraviolet light before arrest and without a warrant did not 
                                                          
140 Id. at 261-62. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (citing Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 
(1960) (holding that “what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected”). 
144 See United States v. Dionosio, 410 U.S. 1 (1978) (analyzing the right to 
privacy in one’s voice); United States v. Doe, 457 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(analyzing the right to privacy in handwriting samples); United States v. 
Richardson, 388 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1968) (discussing the right to privacy in 
one’s hands); State v. Shearer, 30 P.3d 995 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (analyzing the 
right to privacy in one’s eyes.) 
145 Id. 
146 United States v. Richardson, 388 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1968). 
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constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.147 However, the 
court relied heavily on the fact that the petitioner had agreed to the 
search, “gambl[ing] on his ability to convince the officers of his 
innocence.”148 The Richardson court did not discuss whether the 
petitioner would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his hands had he not voluntarily shown them to the officers.149 
In United States v. Dionisio, the Supreme Court considered 
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his voice.150 The Court concluded that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a person’s voice because it is “constantly 
exposed to the public” and “repeatedly produced for others to 
hear.”151 The Court relied on Katz and determined that a person’s 
voice is something that one knowingly exposes to the public; 
therefore, it is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection.152 
Similarly, in U.S. v. Doe, the Second Circuit held that handwriting 
samples could be compelled by subpoena in a grand jury 
proceeding because there is “no intrusion into an individual’s 
privacy . . . [since] nothing is exposed to the grand jury that has not 
previously been exposed to the public at large.”153 
State courts have examined similar questions. In State v. 
Shearer, the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected a petitioner’s claim 
that his right to privacy was violated when he was pulled over by a 
                                                          
147 Id. at 845. In Richardson, FBI agents dusted stolen bank bags with 
fluorescein powder, which becomes florescent under ultraviolet light. After the 
petitioner and his accomplice retrieved the bags, FBI agents and police dropped 
in on the petitioner at work and asked him if they could view his hands under a 
light without explaining to the petitioner the purpose of this request. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (involving a challenge 
on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds by two grand jury witnesses who were 
held in contempt of court for refusing to provide voice samples). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 14 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
153 United States v. Doe, 457 F.2d 895, 899 (2d Cir. 1972) (challenging on 
Fourth Amendment grounds a judgment of contempt by the Southern District of 
New York related to the appellant’s refusal to provide the grand jury with a 
handwriting sample). 
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police officer and asked to remove his sunglasses.154 The court 
held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person’s 
eyes and stated that “taking minimal steps to temporarily conceal a 
facial characteristic that is ordinarily and frequently exposed to the 
public is, in our view, insufficient to create a legitimate expectation 
of privacy.”155 
Taken together, these rulings indicate that courts will not 
uphold a right to privacy in a feature that is normally in plain view 
and that the petitioner generally makes no effort to conceal.156 For 
the most part, these decisions rely on the Supreme Court’s 
assertion in Dionisio, which provides that “[n]o person can have a 
reasonable expectation that others will not know the sound of his 
voice, any more than he can expect that his face will be a mystery 
to the world.”157 Although these words would seem fatal to a case 
asserting a right to privacy in one’s face, the Dionisio Court 
qualified its statement by asserting that “[e]xcept for the case of 
the rare recluse who chooses to live his life in complete solitude, in 
our daily lives we constantly speak and write.”158 Indeed, the Court 
concluded its opinion by noting that “nothing [was] being exposed 
to the grand jury that [was] not previously . . . exposed to the 
public at large.”159 Therefore, it is not clear whether the “rare 
recluse” possesses a right to privacy in her handwriting or voice 
samples.160 Unlike members of the general public, a recluse 
presumably has not exposed the characteristic in question to “the 
public at large.”161 Like a recluse, a veiled Muslim woman keeps 
                                                          
154 State v. Shearer, 30 P.3d 995 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001). 
155 Id. at 1000. The Freeman case is easily distinguishable from Shearer 
because Freeman constantly wore her veil. Therefore, her head and face were 
not “ordinarily and frequently exposed to the public,” unlike the petitioner’s 
eyes in Shearer. 
156 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1972) (citing United 
States v. Doe, 457 F.2d 895, 898-99 (2d Cir. 1972)); State v. Shearer, 30 P.3d 
995, 1000 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001). 
157 Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 14. 
158 Id. (citing United States v. Doe, 457 F.2d 895, 898-99 (2d Cir. 1972)). 
159 Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 14. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
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her face regularly concealed from the public.162 Because no court 
has ever ruled on whether there is a privacy interest in the case of a 
person who regularly keeps private a physical feature freely 
exposed by the general population, such a case would be one of 
first impression in the United States. 
2. The Katz Test: Expectation of Privacy That Society Is Prepared 
to Recognize as Reasonable 
The Supreme Court has not set forth a bright line test for 
establishing how to evaluate the second prong of Katz, that is, 
whether society is prepared to recognize a privacy right as 
reasonable.163 However, the Supreme Court has decided several 
cases upholding certain privacy expectations as ones that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.164 For example, in Minnesota 
v. Olson, the Court held inadmissible as evidence a confession 
made by an individual who was arrested in a home where he was 
staying as an overnight guest after the police had entered without a 
warrant and with their guns drawn.165 The Olson Court rejected the 
government’s argument that the defendant was not entitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection because the place he was staying 
was not his home.166 The Court relied on Katz to demonstrate that 
Fourth Amendment protection extends beyond one’s home and 
focused on the fact that the defendant was an overnight guest in the 
searched home.167 The Court explained that society recognizes as 
reasonable an expectation of privacy by overnight visitors in a 
                                                          
162 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *1 (“Plaintiff wears the niqab in front 
of all strangers and unrelated Muslim men.”). 
163 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984); Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 351 (1967) (Harlan J., concurring). 
164 See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (holding that an arrest 
warrant was required to arrest an overnight guest in the home of a third person); 
see also Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (involving the manipulation 
of a bus passenger’s bag by a law enforcement agent). 
165 Olson, 495 U.S. at 94. 
166 Id. at 96-99. 
167 Id. 
OREN MACROED CORRECTED 062205.DOC 6/22/2005 3:49 PM 
884 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
host’s home: 
To hold that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in his host’s home merely recognizes the 
everyday expectations of privacy that we all share. Staying 
overnight in another’s home is a longstanding social 
custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by 
society. We stay in others’ homes when we travel to a 
strange city for business or pleasure, when we visit our 
parents, children, or more distant relatives out of town, 
when we are in between jobs or homes, or when we house-
sit for a friend. We will all be hosts and we will all be 
guests many times in our lives. From either perspective, we 
think that society recognizes that a houseguest has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in a host’s home.168 
Similarly, in Bond v. United States, the Supreme Court 
considered whether a search resulted when a government agent 
checking a bus for illegal immigrants squeezed a passenger’s bag 
located in the bus’s overhead storage bin.169 Finding that society 
recognizes as reasonable a passenger’s expectation that his bags 
will not be physically manipulated, the Court explained: 
When a bus passenger places a bag in an overhead bin, he 
expects that other passengers or bus employees may move 
it for one reason or another. Thus, a bus passenger clearly 
expects that his bag may be handled. He does not expect 
that other passengers, or bus employees will, as a matter of 
course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner. But this is 
exactly what the agent did here. We therefore hold that the 
agent’s physical manipulation of the petitioner’s bag 
violated the Fourth Amendment.170 
The Supreme Court has also provided guidance with regard to 
when an expectation of privacy is one that society is not prepared 
to recognize as reasonable.171 For example, in Hudson v. Palmer, 
                                                          
168 Id. at 98. 
169 Bond, 529 U.S. at 336 (2000). 
170 Id. at 338-39. 
171 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (holding that society is not 
prepared to recognize the privacy rights of prisoners in their cells). 
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the Court considered the case of an inmate who challenged a 
random search of his prison cell where his contraband property 
was intentionally destroyed.172 The Court held that although 
prisoners have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells, it 
is not one that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate 
because “[t]he recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their 
individual cells cannot be reconciled with the concept of 
incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions.”173 
The Court noted that incarceration is the result of committing a 
crime and that its premise is to withhold an individual’s personal 
freedoms.174 The Court therefore concluded that a prisoner’s 
expectation of privacy in his prison cell is not an expectation that 
society is prepared to accept as reasonable.175 
This body of Supreme Court case law can be used to determine 
on a case-by-case basis whether an expectation of privacy is one 
that society is prepared to accept as reasonable, and therefore, 
whether a search has occurred.176 
B. Unveiling as an Unreasonable Search 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects only 
against unreasonable searches.177 Once a court determines that a 
search has occurred, the court must determine whether the search 
was reasonable.178 As the Supreme Court held in 2000, in City of 
                                                          
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 526. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 525-26. 
176 See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000) (engaging in a 
fact-based analysis to determine whether the expectation that law enforcement 
would not manipulate a passenger’s bag to discover its contents was one that 
society is prepared to accept as reasonable); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 
95-99 (1991) (engaging in a fact-based analysis to determine whether society is 
prepared to accept as reasonable overnight guests’ expectation of protection 
against warrantless searches); Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526 (engaging in a fact-based 
analysis to determine whether society was prepared to recognize as reasonable 
the right of prisoners to protection against unreasonable searches). 
177 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
178 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
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Indianapolis v. Edmond, a search is reasonable if there are “special 
needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement” or if the 
search is an administrative search with a narrowly limited 
purpose.179 In the absence of special needs, individualized 
suspicion is required for a search to be considered reasonable.180 In 
Edmond, the Court examined Indianapolis’ highway checkpoint 
system, whereby cars were stopped and inspected by police from 
the outside and sniffed by a drug dog for signs of illegal drug 
activity.181 The Court held that police activity of this sort 
constitutes a seizure and because such a seizure protects only the 
city’s general interest in crime control, it is unreasonable absent 
individualized suspicion.182 
1. Special Needs 
In special needs cases individualized suspicion is not required 
for a search to be considered reasonable because, by definition, the 
cases are such that “the privacy interests implicated by the search 
are minimal, and . . . an important governmental interest furthered 
by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of 
individualized suspicion.”183 In stating that the case before it was 
not a special needs case, the Edmond Court referenced three cases 
in which it had identified special needs.184 Each of the cases cited 
by the Court in Edmond involved drug testing that was performed 
                                                          
179 Id. The Court also mentions that in certain circumstances “brief 
suspicionless seizures of motorists at fixed Border Patrol checkpoint[s] designed 
to intercept illegal aliens” or sobriety checkpoints may also be considered 
reasonable. Id. (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); 
Michigan v. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)). However, such 
seizures are not relevant to the discussion of the case of a veiled Muslim 
woman. 
180 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37. 
181 Id. at 48. 
182 Id. 
183 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. 
184 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37 (citing Vernonia School Dist. 473 v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646 (1995)); Nat’l Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
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without individualized suspicion or a warrant.185 In Vernonia 
School Dist. 473 v. Acton, the Supreme Court upheld the random 
drug testing of student athletes.186 In National Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab, the Court upheld the drug testing of employees 
who work for U.S. Customs Service and who apply for promotions 
to positions that are directly involved with drugs or in which 
employees are required as part of their jobs to carry a firearm.187 
The Von Raab Court declined to determine whether employees 
who handle classified material should be subject to random drug 
testing as well and remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit for that 
determination.188 In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assoc., 
the Court upheld a Federal Railroad Administration regulation 
requiring blood and urine tests of employees involved in “major 
train accidents” to test for drugs and alcohol.189 
The Supreme Court found in all three cases that drug testing 
implicated the Fourth Amendment.190 The Court then balanced the 
character of the intrusion against the governmental interest 
furthered by the intrusion.191 In each case, the Court held that the 
intrusiveness of a urinalysis is minimal.192 In determining that the 
                                                          
185 Id. 
186 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65. The Vernonia holding was expanded in 
Board of Educ. of Indep. Schools Dist. No. 92 of Pottawtomie v. Earls, 536 U.S. 
822 (2002), in which the Court upheld random drug testing of all students 
involved in extracurricular activities. Id. 
187 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677. 
188 Id. at 678. 
189 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607. 
190 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665; Skinner, 489 
U.S. at 618. 
191 Id. 
192 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658-59; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624; Von Raab, 489 
U.S. at 672. In Vernonia, the Court cited to Skinner and held that the privacy 
interests related to the manner in which the urine was obtained for a urinalysis 
were negligible because female students urinated within a stall and male 
students urinated in a urinal, but were only viewed from behind. Vernonia, 515 
U.S. at 658-59 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626). Further, the Court held that the 
privacy interest in the information that the urinalysis disclosed was minimal as 
well because the test only looked for drugs and not any health condition. Id. 
(citing Skinner, 489 U.S at 617). Further, the Court held that the required 
disclosure of any medications that the students were taking to avoid a false 
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nature of the intrusion of a drug tests is minimal, the Court in 
Vernonia and Von Raab specifically relied on the fact that positive 
results of such tests are not reported to law enforcement 
authorities.193 In Skinner, which involved blood in addition to urine 
testing, the Court cited to its decision in Schmerber v. California, 
which held that blood tests are not significant privacy intrusions 
because such “tests are commonplace in these days of periodic 
physical examinations and experience with them teaches that the 
quantity of blood extracted is minimal and that for most people the 
procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma or pain.”194 
Having found that the privacy interests involved were minimal, 
the Court in all three cases found that there were special needs that 
outweighed the minimal privacy concern.195 In Vernonia, the Court 
held that deterring drug use in school children constituted a special 
need.196 Additionally, in Von Raab, the Supreme Court held that 
because those working in drug departments or those required to 
carry a firearm for the U.S. Customs Service “depend uniquely on 
their judgment and dexterity, these employees cannot reasonably 
expect to keep from the Service personal information that bears 
                                                          
positive result also was minimal. Id. at 658-59. 
193 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658-59; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663. The Skinner 
Court specifically stated that the testing was not for prosecutorial purposes, but 
rather, as a way to prevent train accidents. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620. 
194 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 770-71 (1966)). 
195 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672; Skinner, 489 
U.S. at 607. 
196 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661. The Court held: 
Drugs had not been a major problem in Vernonia schools. In the mid-
to-late 1980’s, however, teachers and administrators observed a sharp 
increase in drug use. Students began to speak out about their attraction 
to the drug culture, and to boast that there was nothing the school could 
do about it. Along with more drugs came more disciplinary problems. 
Between 1988 and 1989 the number of disciplinary referrals in 
Vernonia schools rose to more than twice the number reported in the 
early 1980’s, and several students were suspended. . . . Not only were 
student athletes included among the drug users, but, as the District 
Court found, athletes were the leaders of the drug culture. 
Id. at 648-49. 
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directly on their fitness.”197 Lastly, the Skinner Court held that 
special needs existed, given the significant use of drugs and 
alcohol by railway employees.198 
2. Limited Purpose Administrative Searches 
The Edmond Court also cited three cases in which the Supreme 
Court had examined administrative searches conducted without a 
warrant.199 In only one of those cases did the Court hold that an 
absolute exemption from the warrant requirement was appropriate, 
based on the limited nature of the administrative search in 
question.200 In New York v. Burger, the Supreme Court upheld a 
New York statute permitting authorities to systematically search 
                                                          
197 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672. The Court held: 
The Government’s compelling interest in preventing the promotion of 
drug users to positions where they might endanger the integrity of our 
Nation’s borders or the life of the citizenry outweigh the privacy 
interests of those who seek promotion to these positions, who enjoy a 
diminished expectation of privacy by virtue of the special, and obvious 
physical and ethical demands of those positions. 
Id. at 679. 
198 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607, n.1 (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 30,726 (1983)). 
The FRA noted that a 1979 study examining the scope of alcohol abuse 
on seven major railroads found that “[a]n estimated one out of eight 
railroad workers drank at least once while on duty during the study 
year.” In addition, “5% of workers reported to work ‘very drunk’ or got 
‘very drunk’ on duty at least once in the study year,” and “13% of 
workers reported to work at least ‘a little drunk’ one or more times 
during that period.” The study also found that 23% of the operating 
personnel were “problem drinkers,” but that only 4% of these 
employees “were receiving help through an employee assistance 
program, and even fewer were handled through disciplinary 
procedures.” 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
199 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (citing New 
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987)); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 
511 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San 
Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)). 
200 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987). 
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junkyards without a warrant in order to look for stolen property.201 
The Court in Burger found that the owners of commercial property 
employed in closely regulated industries have a lesser expectation 
of privacy with regard to that property.202 The Court held that even 
in closely regulated industries three criteria must be met in order 
for warrantless searches to be permitted: 1) “there must be a 
‘substantial’ governmental interest that informs the regulatory 
scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made”;203 2) “the 
warrantless inspection must be ‘necessary to further the regulatory 
scheme”;204 and 3) “[t]he statute’s inspection program, in terms of 
the certainty and regularity of its application, must provide a 
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.”205 The Burger 
Court found that the New York junkyard statute fulfilled its three-
prong test.206 First, the Court cited to a statement by the governor 
of New York approving the statute, in which the governor 
emphasized the magnitude of the problem of car theft in the state 
and explained that New York had a “substantial interest in 
regulating the vehicle dismantling and automobile junk 
industry.”207 Second, the Court held that the “regulation of the 
                                                          
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 702 (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981); United 
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75 (1970)). 
204 Burger, 482 U.S. at 703 (citing Dewey, 452 U.S. at 600). 
205 Id. at 703. 
206 Id. at 708. 
207 Id. The Governor stated: 
Motor vehicle theft in New York State has been rapidly increasing. It 
has become a multimillion dollar industry which has resulted in an 
intolerable economic burden on the citizens of New York. In 1976, 
over 130,000 automobiles were reported stolen in New York, resulting 
in losses in excess of $225 million. Because of the high rate of motor 
vehicle theft, the premiums for comprehensive motor vehicle insurance 
in New York are significantly above the national average. In addition 
stolen automobiles are often used in the commission of other crimes 
and there is a high incidence of accidents resulting in property damage 
and bodily injury involving stolen automobiles. 
Id. (citing Governor’s Message approving L.1979, chs. 691 and 692, 1979 N.Y. 
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vehicle-dismantling industry reasonably serves the State’s 
substantial interest in eradicating automobile theft” because “it is 
well established that the theft problem can be addressed effectively 
by controlling the receiver of, or market in stolen property.”208 
Lastly, the Court held that the statute itself provides for a 
“constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant” because it 
informs the operator of a junkyard that searches will be made on a 
regular basis and that these searches are “not discretionary acts by 
a governmental official.”209 Additionally, the court held that the 
“time, place, and scope” of the search are limited because such 
inspections can only be made during normal business hours.210 
In the two remaining limited purpose administrative search 
cases cited by the Edmond Court, the Court also examined 
warrantless searches of property.211 In Michigan v. Tyler, the Court 
held that no warrant is required for firefighters to enter a building 
to fight a fire and that “once in the building, officials may remain 
there for a reasonable time thereafter to investigate the cause of the 
blaze.”212 The Court noted, however, that additional entries to 
investigate a fire require a warrant.213 Further, in Camara v. 
Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, the 
Court held that warrantless inspections of properties by housing 
and public health officials pursuant to San Francisco’s Housing 
Code are unconstitutional.214 The above cases instruct that a search 
will be deemed unreasonable in the absence of individualized 
suspicion unless special needs exist or the search falls into the very 
narrow category of a limited purpose administrative search. 
                                                          
Laws 1826, 1826-1827 (McKinney)). 
208 Burger, 482 U.S. at 709 (citing 2 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 8.10(a) (1986); 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND 
JUSTICE 789 (Kadish ed. 1983)). 
209 Id. at 711. 
210 Id. (citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972)). 
211 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (citing Michigan v. 
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507-09, 511-12 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court of City 
and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967)). 
212 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 511. 
213 Id. 
214 Camara, 387 U.S. at 540. 
OREN MACROED CORRECTED 062205.DOC 6/22/2005 3:49 PM 
892 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
IV. FREE EXERCISE AND PROTECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE 
SEARCHES AS A CONJOINED CLAIM 
Although Freeman’s lawyer did not so argue, Freeman’s claim 
is one that falls into the “hybrid” category of free exercise claims 
because Freeman may assert a conjoining constitutional claim that 
merits federal attention.215 In addition to her free exercise claim, 
Freeman could have argued that the Florida driver’s license statute 
was a violation of both her right to free exercise and her right to 
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches. This 
section analyzes a claim such as Freeman’s as both a standalone 
Fourth Amendment claim, which Freeman might have asserted 
independent of any other relief, and as a hybrid claim. 
In her case before the Florida Circuit Court, Freeman indeed 
asserted a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights; however, the 
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the State on that 
claim, holding that Freeman did not have an objective expectation 
of privacy in her face.216 As previously noted, there is a split in the 
circuit courts with regard to the permissibility of hybrid claims.217 
Even assuming the existence of these claims, the Supreme Court 
has yet to address how strong a conjoined claim must be to proceed 
as a hybrid claim.218 Courts requiring that a conjoining claim be 
capable of succeeding on its own render the assertion of free 
exercise claims unnecessary, as once a court determines that the 
plaintiff has prevailed on her conjoining claim it need not continue 
on to analyze the plaintiff’s alternative constitutional claims.219 
However, in courts that require that the conjoining claim be 
                                                          
215 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (distinguishing hybrid cases from those to 
which the Sherbert test does not apply). See also Crane, supra note 55; see also 
supra text accompanying note 85. 
216 Brief for Appellant at 44, Freeman v. State, No. 2002-CA-2828, 2003 
WL 21338619 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 6, 2003). 
217 See supra note 105 (noting the current status of the law among the 
circuits). 
218 See supra Part I.B (outlining the present status of hybrid cases). 
219 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hileah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 
(1993) (Souter J., concurring) (noting that requiring the conjoining claim of a 
hybrid claim to be strong on its own alleviates the need for a hybrid claim). 
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colorable, establishing a standalone Fourth Amendment claim is 
the key to the assertion of a viable hybrid claim.220 In those courts, 
once the plaintiff demonstrates that she has a colorable Fourth 
Amendment claim, the court will analyze the statute under strict 
scrutiny, requiring that the state’s compelling interest outweigh the 
burden to the plaintiff and that the statute be the least restrictive 
means of accomplishing the state’s objective.221 
A. Fourth Amendment Claim 
For a Fourth Amendment claim to succeed, the individual 
asserting such a claim must first demonstrate that a search occurred 
and then that the search was unreasonable.222 There is no reported 
federal or state case analyzing the Fourth Amendment right of a 
Muslim woman who wears a face veil.223 However, cases that have 
analyzed the extent of an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
protection against unreasonable searches may shed some light on 
                                                          
220 See supra Part I.B. 
221 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 899 (O’Connor J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (indicating that the least restrictive means test is appropriate 
for determining whether a government regulation of criminal law interferes with 
an individual’s right to free exercise of religion). Although, the majority’s 
holding in Smith indicates that the least restrictive means test does not apply to 
neutral laws of general applicability, it remains the test for hybrid claims, as the 
Court specifically excluded those claims from its holding. Id. at 882. 
222 See supra Part III. 
223 A Westlaw search for “all state and federal cases” using the search 
terms “Muslim” and “veil” and “privacy” produced four cases. Ctr. for Nat’l 
Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (involving 
suit under FOIA for information on the detention of people following the 
September 11th attacks); Freeman v. State, No. 2002-CA-2828, 2003 WL 
21338619 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 6, 2003); Adsani v. Miller, No. 94 Civ. 9131, 1996 
WL 194326 (S.D.N.Y. April 22, 1996) (involving copyright infringement 
dispute); State v. Sport and Health Clubs Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985) 
(involving discrimination claims in hiring, employment, and promotion based on 
religion). Three cases were entirely unrelated to this issue. One was Freeman v. 
State. A Westlaw search of all state and federal cases with the terms “Muslim,” 
“veil,” and “Fourth Amendment” produced no cases. A search of LexisNexis of 
its federal and state cases using the same search terms produced the same 
results. 
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these rights.224 
1. A Veiled Woman’s Subjective Expectation of Privacy 
According to the test articulated by Justice Harlan in his 
concurrence in Katz, in order for a veiled Muslim woman to 
successfully assert that requiring her to unveil constitutes a search 
under the Fourth Amendment, she must first demonstrate that she 
has a subjective expectation of privacy in her face.225 Based on the 
analysis of the aforementioned Fourth Amendment cases, which 
rely heavily on exposure to the general public of the feature 
claimed to be private, it is possible that a court may conclude that a 
veiled Muslim woman whose face has not been exposed to the 
public has an actual expectation of privacy in her face.226 A woman 
who chooses to veil her face protects it from exposure to the 
general public.227 Accordingly, a veiled woman has a heightened 
expectation of privacy in her face because she seeks to preserve it 
as private.228 Unlike cases in which individuals have resisted 
orders to produce voice and handwriting samples after an offense 
has occurred, a veiled woman chooses to preserve the feature 
claimed as private before its production was requested.229 Further, 
                                                          
224 See United States v. Dionosio, 410 U.S. 1 (1978); see also United States 
v. Doe, 457 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Richardson, 388 F.2d 842 
(6th Cir. 1968); State v. Shearer, 30 P.3d 995 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001). 
225 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
226 See supra Part III (detailing the requirements of the Katz test and 
distinguishing Freeman’s case from previous cases in which an expectation of 
privacy was alleged in a body part). 
227 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *1. “Plaintiff wears the niqab in front 
of all strangers and unrelated Muslim men.” Id. (indicating that the plaintiff’s 
face is not “ordinarily and frequently exposed to the public”). 
228 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (holding that “what [a person] seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected”). 
229 Compare United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1978) (involving the 
refusal of witnesses to furnish voice samples to a grand jury in an investigation 
relating to possible federal statutes prohibiting gambling), with Freeman, 2003 
WL 21338610 (reviewing the requirement that veiled Muslim women unveil for 
their drivers license photographs). 
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in contrast to cases in which the petitioners spoke, wrote, and 
walked about freely without attempting to hide their handwriting, 
voices, or appearance, a veiled Muslim woman regularly covers 
her face and does not expect it to be seen.230 Likewise, unlike an 
individual’s eyes that have been temporarily hidden by sunglasses, 
a veiled Muslim woman’s face has not previously been exposed to 
the public.231 A Muslim woman who chooses to veil has 
determined that she is commanded by Allah not to reveal her face 
as part of the requirement that she dress modestly.232 Because she 
believes that she is choosing to follow the will of God, she dresses 
in this manner at all times when she is in public.233 Thus, a veiled 
Muslim woman would not reasonably expect the public to see her 
                                                          
230 See United States v. Dionosio, 410 U.S. 1; Freeman, 2003 WL 
21338610. 
231 See Shearer, 30 P.3d at 1000 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (finding no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s eyes by a sunglass wearer and 
holding that “taking minimal steps to temporarily conceal a facial characteristic 
that is ordinarily and frequently exposed to the public is, in our view, 
insufficient to create a legitimate expectation of privacy”). But see Freeman, 
2003 WL 21338619, at *1 (indicating that the plaintiff’s face is not “ordinarily 
and frequently exposed to the public”). Note that in Freeman’s case, Freeman 
converted to Islam in 1997 and began veiling at that time. Brief for Appellant at 
3, Freeman v. State, No. 2002-CA-2828, 2003 WL 21338619 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 
6, 2003). Therefore, the fact that she at one time did freely expose her face to the 
public could be used in argument against Ms. Freeman’s subjective expectation 
of privacy in her face. 
232 See Statement by Sultaana Lakiana Myke Freeman, May 27, 2003, 
available at http://www.aclufl.org/issues/religious_liberty/freemanpersonal_ 
statement.cfm (last visited Apr. 5, 2005). Ms. Freeman stated: 
I discovered veiling to be the ultimate in self-respect and feminism, as 
this liberating act sent a clear message that I am not an object of sexual 
fulfillment but a person of strong religious conviction. Whether you 
believe that the niqab is a requirement of Muslim women or not, the 
fact is ? [sic] it is how I have chosen to practice my religion. I wear the 
niqab because I believe that according to The Qur’an and Sunnah, 
Allah has legislated for the believing woman to dress in this modest 
way. Embracing the niqab was a very personal choice, and I thank 
Allah for the protection it has afforded me in life, as a woman of faith. 
Id. 
233 Id. See also Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *1. 
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face and could arguably establish a subjective expectation of 
privacy in her face under Katz.234 
2. A Veiled Muslim Woman’s Objective Expectation of Privacy 
The second prong of the Katz test requires that the claimed 
privacy right be one that society is prepared to accept as 
reasonable.235 The same privacy concerns at issue in Olson and 
Bond appear in the case of a veiled Muslim woman.236 Just as 
society understands that a person staying with a friend or relative is 
entitled to privacy and that a bus passenger’s bags should not be 
squeezed for contraband items, so too should society value the 
choice that religious people make to dress as their religions 
mandate.237 Practicing religion in the United States is, like being 
                                                          
234 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (holding that the petitioner has a right to 
privacy in the conversation he has in a phone booth because he is “entitled to 
assume that the words he enters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the 
world”). 
235 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
236 Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 
U.S. 91 (1990). 
237 See Olson, 495 U.S. at 98 (holding that society is prepared to recognize 
a right to privacy of a houseguest in his host’s home). See Bond, 529 U.S. at 339 
(recognizing bus passenger’s right not to have his or her bags manipulated as 
part of a search for contraband items). See also President George W. Bush, 
Remarks by the President at the Islamic Center of Washington D.C. (Sept. 17, 
2001) (discussing the fact that Muslim women who wear head coverings should 
be treated with respect), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2001/09/20010917-11.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2005). 
America counts millions of Muslim amongst our citizens and Muslims 
make an incredibly valuable contribution to our country. Muslims are 
doctors, lawyers, law professors, members of the military, 
entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, moms and dads. And they need to be 
treated with respect. In our anger and emotion, our fellow Americans 
must treat each other with respect. Women who cover their heads in 
this country must feel comfortable going outside their homes. Moms 
who wear cover must not be intimidated in America. That’s not the 
America I know. That’s not the America I value. I’ve been told that 
some fear to leave; some don’t want to go shopping for their families; 
some don’t want to go about their daily routines because, by wearing 
cover, they’re afraid they’ll be intimidated. That should not and will not 
OREN MACROED CORRECTED 062205.DOC 6/22/2005 3:49 PM 
 MUSLIM WOMEN AND DRIVER’S LICENSE PHOTOS 897 
and having an overnight guest, a “longstanding social custom that 
serves functions recognized as valuable by society.”238 Indeed, the 
Fourth Amendment is implicated when a state’s policy requires 
that a Muslim woman unveil because society respects the choice of 
Muslim women to follow her religion and wear a veil. Requiring 
that a Muslim woman remove her veil for a driver’s license 
photograph would be disrespectful to that choice and an intrusion 
upon her privacy just as law enforcement’s squeezing a 
passenger’s bag intrudes on the privacy of a person’s personal 
possessions.239 
Further, the case of a veiled Muslim woman is notably distinct 
from cases in which prisoners’ expectations of privacy were held 
to be unreasonable in light of the unique goals of punitive 
confinement.240 The objective of a driver’s license, unlike the 
objective of prisons, is not to restrict a person’s privacy, but rather, 
to ensure safety on the roads and to enable the state to verify that 
individuals on the road have fulfilled certain state requirements.241 
                                                          
stand in America. 
Id. 
238 Olson, 495 U.S. at 98. 
239 Bond, 529 U.S. at 339. The rationale of the Court in holding that the law 
enforcement officer’s squeezing of a bus passenger’s bag violates the Fourth 
Amendment was that if society expects individuals to value something as 
private, then this expectation applies to law enforcement officers as well. Id. 
Additionally, removing a veiled Muslim woman’s veil without her consent 
would likely constitute criminal battery in most, if not every, state. See FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 784.03(1)(a)(1) (West 2003). “The offense of battery occurs when 
a person: Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the 
will of the other.” Id. 
240 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). 
241 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.263 (West 2004). 
It is declared to be the legislative intent to: (1) Provide maximum safety 
for all persons who travel or otherwise use the public highways of the 
state. (2) Deny the privilege of operating motor vehicles on public 
highways to persons who, by their conduct and record, have 
demonstrated their indifference for the safety and welfare of others and 
their disrespect for the laws of the state and the orders of the state 
courts and administrative agencies. (3) Discourage repetition of 
criminal action by individuals against the peace and dignity of the state, 
its political subdivisions, and its municipalities and impose increased 
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Whereas there is no societal expectation of privacy in a prison cell, 
society indeed recognizes the privacy rights of members of free 
society. Thus, individuals lawfully applying for driver’s licenses 
are likely entitled to Fourth Amendment rights.242 Based on this 
reasoning, a court could find that a veiled Muslim woman’s 
expectation of privacy in her face is one that society is expected to 
recognize as reasonable. 
3. Unveiling as an Unreasonable Search 
If requiring a veiled Muslim woman to unveil is considered a 
search, then absent individualized suspicion, special needs, or the 
classification of the search as a limited purpose administrative 
search, it would be deemed unreasonable, and therefore, a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.243 In the case of a driver’s license 
photograph requirement, individualized suspicion is lacking 
because such a policy is a broad one that applies to all individuals 
seeking driver’s licenses and is unrelated to particularized 
suspicion.244 Consequently, a search of a woman’s veil could only 
be deemed reasonable if it were characterized as a search related to 
special needs or as a limited purpose administrative search.245 
Special needs cases are cases in which “the privacy interests 
implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important 
governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in 
                                                          
and added deprivation of the privilege of operating motor vehicles upon 
habitual offenders who have been convicted repeatedly of violations of 
traffic laws. 
Id. 
242 See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527 (citing Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 
143-44) (internal quotations omitted). “A prison shares none of the attributes of 
privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room.” Id. This quotation 
implies that there is a recognized privacy right in the locations the Court lists 
that are representative of free society. 
243 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (listing the 
categories of searches that are considered reasonable). 
244 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.142(1) (West 2004) (requiring a full-face 
photograph for all those seeking a driver’s license). 
245 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37. 
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jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion.”246 
Photographing the face of a Muslim woman who chooses to veil 
would likely not fall into the special needs category. First, in 
special needs cases, the privacy interests are necessarily 
minimal.247 However, the intrusion into a Muslim woman’s veil to 
view her face may not be considered minimal; indeed, the nature of 
this intrusion is decidedly distinct from the intrusions previously 
examined by the Supreme Court.248 For example, required 
unveiling is unlike urine testing, during which an attendant hears a 
person urinating or sees the back of a man while he is urinating. As 
noted by the Supreme Court in Vernonia, people often use public 
bathrooms, where the sounds of their excreting urine can be heard 
by others.249 Therefore, requiring that a person supervise students 
or employees by hearing them urinate is not a substantial invasion 
of the students’ or employees’ privacy.250 However, in the case of 
a veiled Muslim woman, the woman’s face is never unveiled to the 
public,251 and therefore, the invasion of her privacy is substantial. 
The fact that the driver’s license photograph requirement applies to 
the population as a whole does not diminish the fact that the 
driver’s license requirement violates a veiled Muslim woman’s 
Fourth Amendment right. With respect to society generally, the 
vast majority of individuals have no privacy interest in their faces, 
and therefore, the driver’s license requirement is valid as applied to 
them.252 However, because veiled Muslim women have a uniquely 
significant expectation of privacy in their faces, required unveiling 
                                                          
246 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989). 
247 Id. 
248 Vernonia School Dist. 473 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Nat’l 
Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Railway 
Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
249 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658. “[The conditions of urine sample 
collection] are nearly identical to those typically encountered in public 
restrooms, which men, women, and especially schoolchildren see daily.” Id. 
250 Id. “Under such conditions, the privacy interests comprised by the 
process of obtaining the urine sample are in our view negligible.” Id. 
251 See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
252 See supra Part III.A.1. (discussing a person’s expectation of privacy in a 
physical attribute). 
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is a great invasion that is unjustified by the state’s asserted interest 
in safety. Moreover, while urinalysis tests can be designed so that 
they do not detect any health information about the person being 
tested other than whether he or she has used illicit drugs,253 the 
photograph of a veiled Muslim woman is a revelation of her face—
the very characteristic she seeks to protect against exposure.254 The 
case of veiled Muslim women is similarly distinct from specials 
needs cases with regard to the degree to which the searched 
individual’s private information is revealed publicly. In special 
needs drug testing cases, individuals subjected to testing may be 
required to reveal to testers certain illnesses for which they are 
being medicated to avoid a false positive results; in such cases, the 
exposure of this information can be limited to the testers.255 
Further, this information may be completely anonymous, as the 
testers who perform urinalysis tests and see the students’ or 
employees’ forms may have never seen the subjects of the tests 
themselves and may have no additional information about the 
tested individuals.256 In the case of a veiled Muslim woman, 
however, because a driver’s license will certainly contain both the 
woman’s photograph and name, anonymity cannot serve to protect 
the woman from an association with the private characteristic she 
has revealed.257 
In determining the existence of a special need, the Supreme 
Court, in Vernonia, Von Raab, and Skinner, identified an existing 
problem among the class of people upon which the states whose 
policies were in question sought to impose a search.258 Therefore, 
                                                          
253 See Vernonia, 525 U.S. at 658. 
254 See Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *1. 
255 See id. (stating that respondent student could have requested that the 
medical information that he disclosed only be viewed by the laboratory 
performing the test and not by his coaches or teachers). 
256 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658-59. 
257 See Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *1. 
258 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661 (noting a problem among high school athletes 
taking drugs); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 (noting the problem that the people it 
sought to test for drugs had access to drugs and/or weapons); Skinner, 489 U.S. 
at 607 (noting the problem of railroad accidents resulting from employees 
operating under the influence of drugs and alcohol). 
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in order to establish that a special need exists in the case of a veiled 
Muslim woman, a state would have to identify a problem among 
this class that compels such a search.259 There was no evidence 
mentioned in the Freeman case that among such a class of women 
there is a particularly high incidence of driver’s license fraud or 
even that identifying women who have been pulled over has been a 
problem.260 Therefore, it is unclear that a special need exists. 
Additionally, in order for required unveiling to constitute a 
special needs case there would have to be a special need beyond 
the normal need for law enforcement.261 It is unclear how the 
state’s interest would fit into the category of special needs, as it 
appears that the state’s goals are directly tied to routine law 
enforcement. As in Edmond, where the state’s interest in 
controlling illegal drug activity was viewed as part of the normal 
need for law enforcement,262 in this case, protecting against fraud 
and identifying drivers is similarly part of law enforcement 
activity. Further, in contrast to Vernonia and Von Raab, where the 
results of positive drug tests were not given to law enforcement 
authorities, in this case, the state license database in Freeman was 
specifically maintained for a law enforcement purpose in order to 
assist police officers in doing their jobs.263 
Lastly, the case of a veiled Muslim woman likely does not fall 
into the very limited category of administrative searches that are 
permissible absent individualized suspicion. First, the only case the 
Edmond court cited that blanketly allowed administrative searches 
applied only to commercial property, in which people have a lower 
expectation of privacy.264 In Burger, the object of the search was a 
                                                          
259 Special needs necessitates that “an important governmental interest 
furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of 
individualized suspicion.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. 
260 See Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619. 
261 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. 
262 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48. 
263 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *4 (finding Florida’s compelling state 
interest in the driver’s license requirement is promoting safety and security, 
combating crime, and protecting interstate commerce). 
264 Burger, 482 U.S. at 699 (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-
99 (1981)) (holding that “[a]n expectation of privacy in commercial premises, 
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junkyard that likely had little personal value to its owner and 
offered a reduced expectation of privacy, given that junkyards are 
frequently used to conduct illegal activity in the dismantling and 
selling of parts from stolen vehicles.265 Moreover, in Tyler, the 
Court held that fire investigators may only enter a building without 
a warrant when the building is burning and the primary purpose of 
the entry is to put out the fire.266 
In both Tyler and Camara, the Court demonstrated that there is 
a very high expectation of privacy in one’s home and, absent an 
emergency situation, the Court will not allow a warrantless 
search.267 A veiled Muslim woman has a significant expectation of 
privacy in her face similar to the expectation of privacy that one 
has in his or her home.268 Therefore, she cannot be compelled to 
unveil in a non-emergency situation absent individualized 
suspicion.269 The state may not circumvent this requirement by 
analogizing the woman’s expectation of privacy to that enjoyed by 
the individuals in the administrative search cases reviewed by the 
Court because, in the case of a veiled Muslim woman, the thing 
she expects to keep private is a physical feature that by nature is 
highly personal, rather than commercial property, which is by 
definition impersonal. For this reason, it appears that the search of 
a Muslim woman’s veil may be characterized neither as a special 
needs case nor a limited purpose administrative search. 
B. Application of the Hybrid Strict Scrutiny Test 
Were a veiled Muslim woman to prevail in her claim that the 
state’s driver’s license photograph requirement violated her Fourth 
Amendment rights, she might be able to assert a hybrid claim, 
which would elevate the level of review of her claim to strict 
                                                          
however, is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an 
individual’s home”). 
265 Id. 
266 Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978). 
267 See id. at 511; Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of 
San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
268 See infra Part IV.A.1. 
269 Id. 
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scrutiny.270 This section analyzes a hybrid claim of this nature 
through a balancing of the burden that required unveiling imposes 
upon a Muslim woman who veils and the state interests asserted in 
Freeman.271 
1. Substantial Burden 
As the Supreme Court held in Sherbert, the test of substantial 
burden looks to whether “the purpose or effect of a law is to 
impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate 
invidiously between religions that law is constitutionally invalid 
even though the burden may be characterized as only indirect.”272 
In describing the burden upon a Sabbatarian imposed by the state’s 
disqualification of those who did not accept employment offers 
from the receipt of unemployment benefits, the Sherbert Court 
noted: 
The [lower court’s ruling upholding the unemployment 
compensation policy] forces her to choose between 
                                                          
270 See, e.g., Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. School Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 700 
(10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing the compelling interest test as the appropriate test 
for a hybrid claim). 
271 Recently there have been a number of bills in the House, including the 
Real ID Act of 2005 which passed in the House and was referred to Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary on February 17, 2005, seeking to set federal 
standards for state driver’s licenses. Real I.D. Act of 2005, H.R. 418, 109th 
Cong. (2005). See, e.g., An Act Making Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, for 
the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005, and for Other Purposes, H.R. 1268, 
109th Cong. (2005) (version including driver’s license provisions referred to 
Senate Subcommittee). Driver’s License Security and Modernization Act, H.R. 
368, 109th Cong. (referred to House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border 
Security, and Claims March 2, 2005), available at thomas.loc.gov. These bills 
have yet to pass in the Senate and become law. However, were Congress to pass 
a national standard for state driver’s licenses this analysis would not change 
because this note discusses whether an exception should be made to driver’s 
license laws requiring fullface photographs for veiled Muslim women. The 
question of whether driver’s laws requiring a full face photographs should be put 
in place for the general citizenry or whether there should be a federal scheme for 
state licenses is outside the scope of this Note. 
272 Id. at 404 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)). 
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following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting 
benefits on the one hand, and abandoning one of the 
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the 
other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts 
the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion 
as it would a fine imposed against appellant for her 
Saturday worship.273 
 The burden imposed by requiring that a veiled Muslim woman 
unveil for her driver’s license photograph is tantamount to the 
burden imposed in Sherbert because, in both cases, the religious 
individuals must choose between following their religions and 
receiving a state benefit.274 As in Sherbert, a policy requiring 
exposure by a woman who believes that showing her face is 
prohibited by her religion, as the court found that Freeman does,275 
forces the woman to either forgo a driver’s license, and therefore 
lose the privilege of driving, or to decide not to follow her religion 
and be awarded a driver’s license.276 A Muslim woman who 
chooses to veil does so because she believes that this is what Allah 
requires.277 She thus is in the same position as the petitioner in 
                                                          
273 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. 
274 Id. 
275 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *2. 
276 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. The Court noted: 
The ruling [of the lower court in Sherbert, denying the appellant 
unemployment benefits because she refused to accept work that 
required that she work on Saturday] forces her to choose between 
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one 
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to 
accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a 
choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion 
as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship. 
Id. Driving is necessary to Freeman’s lifestyle. See State: Terrorists May Benefit 
if Veiled Muslim Woman Gets License, Fox News, available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,293388410,00.html. “After the hearing 
Freeman complained that without a license, she can’t even drive to the store to 
buy diapers for her six-month old son.” Id. 
277 See Statement by Sultaana Lakiana Myke Freeman (May 27, 2003), 
available at http://www.aclufl.org/issues/religious_liberty/freemanpersonal_ 
statement.cfm. 
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Sherbert of either following a tenet of her religion or receiving a 
state benefit.278 Therefore, under the Sherbert test, required 
unveiling would likely constitute a substantial burden to veiled 
Muslim women who are required to take full-face photographs in 
order to obtain driver’s licenses. 
 2. Compelling State Interest 
The Freeman court upheld the driver’s license photograph 
requirement as applied to veiled Muslim women on the basis that 
the state has a compelling interest in the statute because it 
promotes public safety and protects against fraud.279 On closer 
examination, however, there are flaws in many of the arguments 
favoring safety and security upon which the court relied. 
a. Speedily Identifying Pulled-Over Drivers 
Among the interests asserted by the state and accepted by the 
Freeman court as compelling was the state’s interest in speedily 
identifying pulled-over drivers.280 It is unquestionable that the state 
has an interest in identifying pulled-over drivers. However, it is not 
clear that requiring that Muslim women unveil for their driver’s 
license photographs will, in actuality, help to achieve that goal. As 
discussed, required unveiling may constitute a search for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, and therefore, absent individualized 
suspicion, police officers will be unable to compel a veiled Muslim 
woman to remove her veil once they have pulled her over so that 
they may match her face with the photograph on her driver’s 
license.281 Moreover, because driver’s license pictures are often 
unflattering and many people may change in appearance 
                                                          
278 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. 
279 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *7. 
280 Id. 
281 See supra Part III.B. (discussing how required unveiling may constitute 
an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment). See also Knowles v. 
Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998) (holding that the full search of a vehicle after the 
driver received a citation for speeding absent probable cause violated the Fourth 
Amendment). 
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subsequent to taking such a picture, identifying an individual by 
her driver’s license picture is not a certainty. Strict scrutiny also 
requires that the state’s method constitute the least restrictive 
means of accomplishing its ends.282 In this instance, a less 
restrictive means of furthering the state’s interest would be to grant 
these woman an exception to the driver’s license photograph 
requirement while adding an additional requirement that those 
women carry with them when they drive certain documents, such 
as a birth certificate or a social security card, verifying their 
identity as the person granted the driver’s license. Because the 
state has not used the least restrictive means of furthering its goal, 
the state’s interest in speedily identifying drivers does not appear 
to outweigh the burden the requirement imposes upon a veiled 
Muslim woman. 
b. To Protect against Driver’s License Fraud 
The Florida court in Freeman also found a compelling state 
interest in the use of driver’s license photographs to protect against 
driver’s license fraud.283 Although a full-face photograph may 
assist in the prevention of fraud in the case of an unlicensed driver 
who borrows the driver’s license of a licensed driver,284 the 
likelihood of such an instance of fraud is extraordinarily rare. Most 
people who are driving have valid licenses and have no need to use 
another’s.285 Moreover, were an individual to drive illegally 
                                                          
282 See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 
707, 718 (1981) (holding that “the state may justify an inroad on religious 
liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some 
compelling interest”). 
283 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *7. 
284 Id. at *4 (outlining the state’s argument that the purpose of a driver’s 
license photographs is for speedy identification and to combat fraud). 
285 Because driver’s license fraud and driving without a license can only be 
documented if the perpetrators are caught, it is difficult to find any statistics on 
the frequency with which driving without a license occurs. However, the 
statistics below were somewhat indicative of the frequency with which people 
drive without a valid driver’s license. Roughly eighty-seven percent of those 
driving in fatal crashes have a valid driver’s license. See AAA Foundation Study 
on Unlicensed Drivers, Table A.1, License Status of Drivers Involved in Fatal 
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without a license, it is unlikely that such a person would bother to 
locate another person’s valid license and, if pulled over, attempt to 
pass it off as her own.286 Further, if an illegal driver decided to use 
another individual’s license as her own when pulled over, she 
would likely borrow the license of someone with similar features, 
given the photograph requirement. It is no more likely that women 
who choose to veil will “share” their driver’s licenses than friends 
or family members who look alike will “share” theirs.287 
Moreover, full-face license photographs will only prevent fraud 
in relation to driving if there is a reasonable suspicion that the 
driver has committed another violation. The Supreme Court held in 
Delaware v. Prouse that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
for police officers to randomly pull over drivers on the highway 
without “an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is 
unlicensed or that an automobile is unregistered or that either the 
vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for a 
violation of the law.”288 The Prouse Court held that the state’s 
interests in public safety were not sufficiently furthered by the 
                                                          
Crashes in the United States 1993-1999 (June 2000), available at 
http://www.aafoundation.org/pdf/UnlicensedToKill2.pdf. Of the 13.5 percent of 
driver’s without valid license, only 3.6 percent have never been issued a driver’s 
license. Id. The rest have driver’s licenses that are either suspended, revoked, 
canceled, or expired. Id. Because this study is composed of drivers involved in 
fatal crashes, it is likely that the percentage of drivers on the road with valid 
licenses is even higher since it is more likely that those without a valid license 
will be involved in a fatal accident since such drivers either never fulfilled the 
license criteria or had their licenses taken away because of a tendency to commit 
driving infractions. Regardless, the study shows that the vast majority of drivers, 
86.5 percent, have a valid license. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660 
(1979) (holding that the state’s interests in public safety were not sufficiently 
furthered by the chance that the individual whom law enforcement officers 
chose to pull over would in fact be in violation of the law). 
286 See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 660 (1979) (holding the state’s interests in 
public safety were not sufficiently furthered by the chance that the individual 
whom law enforcement officers chose to pull over would in fact be in violation 
of the law). 
287 The AAA Foundation Study on Unlicensed Drivers, supra note 285, 
makes no mention of a danger of people with valid licenses “lending” their 
licenses to unlicensed drivers. 
288 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. 
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chance that the individual whom law enforcement officers 
randomly chose to pull over would in fact be in violation of the 
law.289 The court explained: 
It seems common sense that the percentage of all drivers on 
the road who are driving without a license is very small and 
that the number of licensed drivers who will be stopped in 
order to find one unlicensed operator will be large indeed. 
The contribution to highway safety made by discretionary 
stops selected from among drivers generally will therefore 
be marginal at best. . . . Much of the same can be said about 
the safety aspects of automobiles as distinguished from 
drivers . . . . 
. . . . 
 . . . The marginal contribution to roadway safety possibly 
resulting from a system of spot checks cannot justify 
subjecting every occupant of every vehicle on the roads to a 
seizure-limited in magnitude compared to other intrusions 
but nonetheless constitutionally cognizable—at unbridled 
discretion of law enforcement officials.290 
Given that drivers can only be pulled over based on an 
articulable suspicion and not at random, a veiled Muslim woman 
cannot be pulled over unless she has committed a driving 
infraction or is driving a vehicle that is unlicensed or subject to 
seizure.291 In such a case, the need for a positive full-face 
identification would be significantly lessened because the person 
who committed the violation would be in law enforcement 
officer’s presence, and therefore, the need to identify the individual 
in order to ascertain whether the driver’s identity matches that of 
the individual for whom the police are searching is moot because 
the offender has been caught. 
Further, as the Prouse Court observed, the percentage of 
drivers that are unlicensed is small, making the probability that an 
unlicensed driver would be discovered based on a random check 
                                                          
289 Id. at 660. 
290 Id. 
291 Id. at 663. 
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minimal.292 Likewise, because of the small number of Muslim 
women who choose to wear a full-face veil,293 it is improbable that 
this minute percentage of veiled Muslim women will take 
advantage of the fact that they are not required to take full-face 
pictures and craft ways to commit criminal acts in which they 
benefit from the fact that they do not have driver’s licenses with 
full-face photographs. As articulated in Prouse, the minimal risk of 
unlicensed individuals driving on state roads does not justify the 
institution of a police policy of pulling over drivers at random.294 
For the same reason, the minimal risk that a veiled Muslim woman 
will allow another veiled Muslim woman to use her driver’s 
license as her own is insufficient to justify invading the privacy 
rights of all veiled Muslim women who apply for driver’s licenses. 
Therefore, the state’s interest in protecting against driver’s license 
fraud is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the burden that an 
unveiling requirement places upon a veiled Muslim woman. 
c. To Protect against Identity Theft 
The Freeman court noted an additional compelling state 
interest in the state’s use of driver’s license photos in that licenses 
are commonly used as form of identification.295 However, as 
                                                          
292 Id. at 660. 
293 See Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *2. “[M]ost Muslims do not veil 
to the extent the plaintiff does, and that she is in a small minority of Salfeeha 
Muslim women who refuse to remove their veils when they have their pictures 
taken for identification.” Id. There are an estimated 6 to 7 million Muslims in 
the United States. See http://www.cair-net.org/asp/populationstats.asp (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2004). Presumably, half of the Muslim population, around 3.5 
million, are women. Only a small minority of these women wear the full face 
veil. Even if ten percent wear the full face veil, when in reality it is most 
probably a much smaller percentage, this would be 350,000 women. This 
number is roughly .01 percent of the population of the United States. 
294 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 660. 
295 Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *6 (finding that protecting interstate 
commerce from widespread identity theft and fraud is a compelling state 
interest.). But see Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *2, regarding the small 
percentage of women who wear the full-face veil. The fact that such a small 
number of individuals choose to wear the veil and would require an exception 
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Freeman noted, Florida’s Motor Vehicles Statute describing the 
legislative intent for driver’s licenses makes no mention that one of 
the purposes of a driver’s license is to serve as identification.296 
Although as a general state interest it seems sound that private 
industry should be able to have a uniform policy regarding what it 
considers valid forms of identification, the state may maintain this 
policy while still allowing for an exception for a small minority of 
its residents.297 As the Eighth Circuit stated in Quaring v. 
Peterson, “the state may still achieve its interest . . . because 
people may freely refuse to do business [with the respondent] if 
she is unable to present adequate identification.”298 Because 
                                                          
from the full-face photograph requirement negates the Freeman court’s 
argument that such an exception would lead to “widespread abuse.” Id. at *6 
(emphasis added). 
296 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.263 (West 2003) states: 
 It is declared to be the legislative intent to: (1) Provide maximum 
safety for all persons who travel or otherwise use the public highways 
of the state. (2) Deny the privilege of operating motor vehicles on 
public highways to persons who, by their conduct and record, have 
demonstrated their indifference for the safety and welfare of others and 
their disrespect for the laws of the state and the orders of the state court 
and administrative agencies. 
Id. 
297 In fact, it does not seem as though private industry is entirely reliant on 
driver’s licenses as forms of identification. See Identification (ID) Requirements 
for GRE Tests, at http://www.gre.org/idreq.html (listing a driver’s license as a 
valid form of identification but stating that if the license lacked a photograph it 
is not valid). A search of a number of bank websites using the term 
“identification” uncovered no statement by any bank indicating what form of 
identification it will consider valid. See Citizens Bank, Important Information 
About Online Security, at http://www.citizensbank.com/misc/online_security. 
asp (indicating “[w]hen you call us, come to a branch or visit us online, we will 
ask you for some information to verify your identity”). See also 
http://citibank.com (search for term “identification” came up with no relevant 
results). See also http://fleet.com/home.asp (search for term “identification” 
came up with no relevant results). See also http://www.wau. com/servlet/ 
wamu/index.html (search for term “identification” came up with no relevant 
results). 
298 Quaring, 728 F.2d at 1127 (upholding the right of religious Christians 
who believe that photographs are forbidden graven images to be exempted from 
the state’s driver’s license photo requirement). See also supra note 293 
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individuals do not have a Fourth Amendment right to protection 
against unreasonable searches by private entities, a business can 
require any reasonable type of identification it desires in restricting 
access to its services.299 Additionally, the fact that driver’s licenses 
are commonly used as valid forms of identification by airlines and 
other entities does not limit the ability of states to formulate 
exceptions to their driver’s license requirements. The Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and others may determine for 
themselves the types of identification that are required for 
individuals to board planes or make use of other private services; 
at the same time, a state may choose not to burden its religiously 
observant citizens by allowing them an exemption from the 
driver’s license photo requirement.300 
Moreover, if the purpose of the driver’s license photograph 
requirement is to protect individuals who wear a full-face veil from 
identity fraud, this legitimate state interest would be outweighed by 
the burden the requirement imposes on the very group it aims to 
protect. Therefore, a court may find that a state cannot demonstrate 
that its legitimate interest in speedy identification and the 
prevention of fraud outweighs the burden the photograph 
requirement imposes upon veiled Muslim women. It thus is 
possible that a court may find that a state is required to grant an 
exception from the driver’s license photograph requirement to 
veiled Muslim women. 
                                                          
(discussing the small number of Muslim women who veil and, therefore, would 
require an exemption demonstrating the minute effect such an exemption would 
have on businesses). 
299 Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 411-12 (1995). 
“The conduct of a private entity is not subject to constitutional scrutiny if the 
challenged action results from the exercise of private choice and not from state 
influence or coercion.” Id. 
300 Note that although the FAA’s website contains a great deal of 
“Passenger Information,” including “Airline Contact Information,” “Baggage 
Size Requirements” “Check Airport Status,” “Passenger Health and Safety 
Information,” “Travel Tips,” “Using Child Safety Seats,” and “Wait Times at 
Airport Security Checkpoints,” it does not state what it considers valid forms of 
identification. See http://www.faa.gov/passengers/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 
16, 2005). 
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CONCLUSION 
Although there is no federal protection apart from rational 
basis review for an individual claiming that a neutral law of 
general applicability interferes with her free exercise of religion, 
veiled Muslim women may still argue violations of their federal 
constitutional rights to free exercise of religion and Fourth 
Amendment protection through a hybrid claim.301 However, 
because an argument that exposing a veiled Muslim woman’s face 
is a violation of the Fourth Amendment is revolutionary302 and 
because no circuit court has yet applied strict scrutiny based on a 
hybrid claim,303 it seems unlikely that a person in Freeman’s 
position will find recourse in a federal court. Even if the courts are 
unwilling to provide veiled Muslim women with a remedy, 
however, state legislatures retain the authority and the 
responsibility to provide accommodations for the religiously 
observant within their jurisdictions.304 The seemingly negative 
reception of Freeman’s case by the national media and the 
American public suggests that legislatures may choose not to carve 
out an exception for such a marginalized group.305 However, in 
                                                          
301 See supra Part I (outlining the present state of free exercise claims). 
302 See supra Part II.A (analyzing a Muslim woman’s Fourth Amendment 
right to privacy in her face). 
303 Part I.B (outlining the status of hybrid claims). 
304 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (holding it is up to the “political process” to 
protect the interests of individuals whose religious practice is interfered with by 
a neutral law of general applicability). 
305 Debbi Gardiner, Fla. Muslims See Veil Case as Distraction, BOSTON 
GLOBE, June 15, 2003, at A12 (citing to Muslims who criticize Ms. Freeman for 
putting this issue into the spotlight and feel that it reflects poorly on Muslims); 
Susan Taylor Martin, A Fight for Religion or Something More, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, June 15, 2003, at A2 (“Still you have to wonder. Why would someone 
who is fighting so hard to protect one basic right-freedom of religion-adopt the 
dress code of an Islamic sect that has denied right to so many women in 
Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia.”); Gloria Kaplan Sulkin, Driver’s Photos, CHI. 
TRIB., June 13, 2003, at 22 (arguing in a letter that “sanity has prevailed in the 
case of Sultaana Freeman”); License Is Unveiled; Allowing Woman to Hide 
Face in Identification Photo Would Have Been Foolish, THE COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, June 10, 2003, at A10; License Must Do Its Job, SUN-SENTINEL 
(Fla.), June 3, 2003, at A18. 
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denying veiled Muslim women an exception to driver’s license 
photo requirements, legislatures make broader statements about the 
value of religious freedom and their attitudes toward minority 
religious groups. In order to promote religious freedom and 
accommodate the religiously observant, legislatures should 
examine the actual motivations behind what seem to be general 
policy requirements and determine whether state goals truly 
necessitate requiring religious minorities to forgo sacred practices 
or lose state benefits. 
 
